

# THE IDEA OF UNITY

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## 4. IDEAS OF UNITY IN PHILOSOPHY

### a. Heraclitus (c 535-475 B.C.)

Heraclitus's was a pre-Socratic Greek thinker known as the 'weeping philosopher' with interesting and advanced ideas and his work survived as fragments mentioned by later authors. He viewed the universe as an ever changing play of opposites interacting as a whole.

And it is the same thing in us that is quick and dead, awake and asleep, young and old; the former are shifted and become the latter, and the latter in turn are shifted and become the former.<sup>229</sup>

This passage is possibly the first recognition of what the psychologists call enantiodromia, which is the tendency for things to change into their opposite for a restoration of balance and equilibrium and is the governing principal of natural cycles. It is like a swinging pendulum from one side to the other which oscillates between the opposites. Heraclitus also recognised the unity between the opposites as follows:

God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, surfeit and hunger; but he takes various shapes, just as fire, when it is mingled with spices, is named according to the savour of each.<sup>230</sup>

In the next passage, Heraclitus describes the opposites in people with a very interesting observation. Couples are things whole, and not whole.

Couples are things whole and not whole, what is drawn together and what is drawn asunder, the harmonious and discordant. The one is made up of all things, and all things issue from the one.<sup>231</sup>

Heraclitus alludes to a distinction between the opposites in agreement or dispute, which shows them at play in his personality. It is a subtle recognition of the unity between male and female with distinct characteristics as if they were actual people. Like actual people, male and female psychic characters can agree or disagree. In other words, it is the recognition of attracting and repelling forces between a man and woman as the first step in the realisation of wholeness in the individual. The natural projection of one's inner contra-sexual character makes one whole in the first instance. In the second, it is a slow transformation of the idea of one's physical partner to their actual reality. In this process, the inner projection is recognised and withdrawn and our partner becomes an

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<sup>229</sup> PLUTARCH, Ps., Consolation to Apollonius, 106 E.

<sup>230</sup> HIPPOLYTUS, Refutation of all heresies, IX, 10, 8.

<sup>231</sup> ARISTOTLE, Ps., On the World, 5. Text attributed to Heraclitus, p. 396b20

individual in their own right. As I shall attempt to show in this book, wholeness or unity, is an individual achievement and the opposites can only be realised individually.

## b. Plato (c 427-347 B.C.)

Plato differentiated the opposites of Heraclitus further and describes their characteristics. There are two distinct and contrasting elements, rational purpose and the blind operation of necessity. Plato was able to differentiate between the logical and conscious process, and the blind and instinctive urges. He goes on to say that it is man's business to become like the divine and move towards greater awareness, which parallels the psychological development occurring in Egypt and Canaan.

He conceived four primary bodies, earth, air, fire and water and considered these to be the frame of the world, spherical in shape and the highest measure of unity. In the following text, Plato describes his concept of the 'soul'.

Now this soul, though it comes later in the account we are now attempting, was not made by the God younger than the body; for when he joined them together, he would not have suffered the elder to be ruled by the younger. There is in us too much of the causal and random, which shows itself in our speech; but the God made soul prior to the body and more venerable in birth and excellence, to be the body's mistress and governor.<sup>232</sup>

The body and soul in Plato's understanding are in a hierarchy and the soul created first with a higher rank than the body. He also recognised the femininity of the soul has an authority over the body. This shows that Plato regarded his inner female character higher in authority and not an equal partner. In other words, he viewed his soul as an authority character like a mother rather than a sister or wife. Plato's 'Receptacle of Becoming' in the following passage reinforces this idea:

.....one postulated as model, intelligible and always unchangingly real; second a copy of this model, which becomes and is visible. A third we did not then distinguish, thinking that the two would suffice; but now, it seems, the argument compels us to attempt to bring to light and describe a form difficult and obscure. What nature must we, then, conceive it to possess and what part does it play? This more than anything else; that it is the Receptacle as it were, the nurse of all Becoming.<sup>233</sup>

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<sup>232</sup> PLATO'S Cosmology, The Timaeus, Hackett Publishing Company, 1997, pages 58-59

<sup>233</sup> Ibid, The Receptacle, page 177

He continues by explaining the qualities of the Receptacle.

It must be called always the same; for it never departs at all from its own character; since it is always receiving all things, and never in any way what- soever takes on any character that is like any of the things that enter it; By nature it is there as a matrix for everything, changed and diversified by the things that enter it, and their account it appears to have different qualities at different times; while the things that pass in and out are to be called copies of the eternal things,.....<sup>234</sup>

This passage clearly differentiates between what is the model (inner character) and its copy (character) in the physical world, and describes the third character that unites the opposites of inner and outer. To Plato the third is a receptacle or container of the 'model' and a 'nurse of all becoming'. The following text confirms his idea of mother or matrix of the 'model':

Be that as it may, for the present we must conceive three things; that which becomes; that in which it becomes; and the model in whose likeness that which becomes is born. Indeed we may fittingly compare the Recipient to a mother, and the model to a father, and the nature that arises between them to their offspring.<sup>235</sup>

It is clear from his writings, that Plato's idea of mother, father and child has metaphysical significance above everyday life. He first describes an unchanging model (being). Second, a copy of this model with attributes of visual tangibility (body, child). Third, the receptacle and origin of the tangible entity as a nurse or mother. The receptacle has therefore, caring, attending and nurturing qualities.

How did Plato arrive at these ideas and why did he endow the human roles of father, mother and child with such Godlike status? To answer these questions, I shall tabulate their characteristics and review how they relate.

<b>Name</b>	<b>Other Names</b>	<b>Characteristics</b>
Model	Father	Intelligible, unchanging, eternal
Receptacle	Nurse, matrix, mother, soul, mistress, governor	Obscure in form, nurse of all becoming, unchanging
Copy of model	Offspring	Visible, becomes, body

<sup>234</sup> Ibid, The Receptacle, page 182

<sup>235</sup> Ibid, The Receptacle, page 185

Plato had a clear conception of what he calls the model, or what Descartes calls God, the eternal being, the creator in whose likeness we are made, i.e., Plato's copy. The copy of the model is the physical and tangible human being created in his likeness. Plato sees the receptacle of the human offspring as the overarching mother, and in its broadest sense, as Mother Nature, which is akin to the Egyptian mother Nut. The characteristics support this assumption exemplified by her ambiguous qualities, at once secure in her own character, yet appearing to change by the things that enter into it.

The father as Plato explains, has all the characteristics of God as eternal, intelligible and unchangingly real and therefore a God of light and awareness. The Mother on the other hand, is the receptacle or matrix and obscure and difficult to understand. The third form is equivalent to the body, or more precisely, the physical person in the tangible world. The fact that Plato included a feminine character in his conception shows that he was closer to his unity than the later Judaic and Christian traditions, which do not mention a mother of creation, but only a father. This was to some extent, compensated by the Gnostics who introduced the character of Sophia. It makes perfect sense to include the receptacle because creating life as we know it, requires a father and mother.

Plato obviously knew that the physical world complimented the inner world of characters, and therein lays his unity. He came from an era where an intricate web of Gods and Goddesses complimented their conscious lives, albeit in projected form. Life at that time was full of deities residing in mythical and real places such as mountaintops, oceans, underground, and in space. The relationship between the individual and their gods was so real that the simplest emotion was activated by a God and felt in their bodies. For example, when a man fell in love with a woman, Eros made him excited and happy as if struck by an arrow, which is exactly how it feels.

Plato's Cosmology of earth, air, fire and water were to the ancients a category of physical elements with symbolic significance. The physical aspect of the elements is based on our perception, their behaviour and interaction with each other. For example, the earth is solid and unmoving, air moves and brings rain and clouds, fire is from the sun and brings light and heat. Water nourishes the earth and gives life. These elements not only had physical qualities but psychic qualities and as we shall see later in this study, fit into a harmonious quaternity pattern.

### c. Aristotle (384 - 322 B.C.)

Aristotle built on Plato's philosophy from a different point of view. He saw things in a more down-to-earth way and distinguished two antithetical principles to form the basis of not only his Physics, but also his Ethics, Logic and Metaphysics. In the following Aristotle explains the contrasting opposites:

Their differences are obvious and universally recognised; what is not seen so generally is that they are all analogous in so far as they all rest upon the same fundamental conception of antithesis, though some express it in a wider and some in a narrower formula.....But in any case it is clear that the principles must form a contrasted couple.<sup>236</sup>

Aristotle confirms Heraclitus's conception of the opposites and analyses them from various viewpoints. In his Physics, he describes a theory on the heavens and things below the moon subject to generation and decay and above the moon, un-generated and indestructible. The earth, he explains, is spherical and at the centre of the universe. In the sublunary sphere, everything is composed of four elements: earth, air, fire, and water; and he introduces a fifth element, of which the heavenly bodies are composed. He considers the natural movement of the terrestrial elements are rectilinear, but the fifth element is circular. The heavens are perfectly spherical, and the upper regions are more divine than the lower.

The only knowledge the ancients had of upper heavens of moon, sun, planets and stars were perceived through careful unaided observation, as the telescope was not invented until the seventeenth century AD. This limit to their perception and knowledge of outer space provided a hook for projections and shows that even a practical man projects his unconscious contents onto objects when the limits of their knowledge is reached.

Aristotle's materialistic leaning became evident in his physics. He did not question the reality and objectivity of the material world revealed to him by his senses. He says it is neither an illusion nor a mere creation or manifestation of the mind. In his Metaphysics, he regarded the mind as not of a material or tangible nature, but of pure thought and the opposite to the material or sensible world. He explains that God is the first choice and pure thought. Life, he says, belongs to God for the actuality of thought. God is a living being, eternal, most good, and life, duration and

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<sup>236</sup> ARISTOTLE, The Physics, Vol. I, Book I, chapter 4.

eternity, belonging to God. In the following text, Aristotle relates God to the earth.

God exists eternally, as pure thought, happiness, complete self-fulfilment, without any realised purposes. The sensible world on the contrary, is imperfect, but it has life, desire thought of an imperfect kind and aspiration.

All living things are in a greater or lesser degree aware of God, and are moved to action by admiration and love of God. This God is the final cause of all activity.<sup>237</sup>

It is clear from the passage that Aristotle equates God with positive attributes and the sensible world with imperfection and therefore, less than positive. He explains that all living things are aware of and move towards God. He also describes how his psychic activity and the sensible physical world have a relationship by an intermediary or third form.

Since all change is between opposites, and opposites are either contraries or contradictories, and there is nothing between contradictories, it is clear that the intermediate or 'between' can only exist when there are two contraries.<sup>238</sup>

Thus, if our former insistence on the two terms of some antithesis being principles is sound, and if we are now convinced that these antithetical principles need something to work on, and if we are to preserve both these conclusions, must we not necessarily posit a third principle as the subject on which the antithetical principles act?<sup>239</sup>

In his Ethics, he introduces the intermediary element as the soul, one part being rational and the other irrational. The irrational he equates with the vegetative, appetitive and instinctual functions related to the body. The mind in his view, bound less to the soul than the body. The mind, or the power to think and understand, is alone capable of isolation from all other psychic powers. The soul is what moves the body and perceives sensible objects; its characteristics are self-nutrition, sensation, feeling and motivity, but the mind has the higher function of thinking, which has no relation to the body or to the senses. Hence, the mind to Aristotle is immortal, though the soul is not.

He elaborates on this idea of the soul in his book "De Anima" by stating:

Indeed an acquaintance with the soul would seem to help much in acquiring

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<sup>237</sup> RUSSELL Bertrand, History of Western Philosophy, p 181, Allen & Unwin Aust P/L 1990

<sup>238</sup> ARISTOTLE, The Physics, Vol II, Book V, p.37.

<sup>239</sup> ARISTOTLE, The Physics, Vol. I, Book I, #6,p.59.

all truth, especially about the natural world; for it is, as it were, the principle of living things.<sup>240</sup>

Taken all together we define soul by three things: movement, sensation, and by immateriality. Some say the soul is one element some say all or some elements.<sup>241</sup>

He explains the soul's relation to the sensible world as opposed to the inner world of mental processes and describes and defines the physical qualities of the soul in the following text:

Bodies especially seem to be substances; and among these, natural bodies, for these are the principles of the others. Of natural bodies some possess vitality, others do not. We mean by 'possessing vitality', that a thing can nourish itself and grow and decay. Now this can mean one of two things: one, as is the possession of knowledge; another, as is the act of knowing. It is plain that it is like knowledge possessed.

If, then, there is one generalization to be made for any and every soul, the soul will be the primary act of a physical bodily organism.<sup>242</sup>

The main function Aristotle attributes to the soul is its ability to sense. He writes at length on the senses of touch, smell, hearing, taste and sight and how they form the basis of the soul. In the following, Aristotle discusses imagination and how inner images resemble the sensible world:

Imagination is a movement produced by sensation actuated. Since sight is the most prominent sense, (imagination) has taken its name from light, as there is no seeing without light.....these images dwell within, and resemble sense experiences.<sup>243</sup>

Indeed, inner images borrow from the sensible world but are in fact selected and composed into symbolic scenes that reflect the individual's relationship to the world. Aristotle's temperament was fundamental to his understanding of imagination and soul. He leaned more towards the earth and senses in contrast to the metaphysical musings of Plato.

In his Ethics, he writes about Intelligence and Intuition and explains how scientific knowledge consists of forming judgements about things that are universal and necessary demonstrable truths. He explains that every form of scientific knowledge (because this involves reasoning) depends upon first principles that we cannot grasp through either science or art. The

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<sup>240</sup> ARISTOTLE, De Anima, Book I, #1, p.41

<sup>241</sup> Ibid #2, p.78.

<sup>242</sup> Ibid Book II, #1, p.163

<sup>243</sup> Ibid Book III, #3, p.394



mind apprehends first principles by intuition. He says a wise man will know first principles and wisdom through intuition and scientific knowledge.

Finally, I would like to show how Aristotle explains Plato's concept of the 'matrix' or 'womb', as he tries to bring the concept down-to-earth and relate it to matter:

They (Platonists) too have a triad of the 'great', the 'small' and the 'idea' (or form) but this triad is really quite different from ours of 'matter', 'shortage' and 'form', for although they go so far with us as to recognize the necessity of some underlying subject, yet in truth the 'great and small' of which it consists can only be equated with our 'matter' and is not a dyad at all.....Now we, who distinguish between matter and shortage, can very well see why matter, which co-operates with form in the genesis of things may be conceived as their matrix or womb. And we can also see how a man who concentrates his mind on the negative and defect involving character of shortage, may come to think of it as purely non-existent.

So that if (to borrow their metaphors) we are to regard matter as the female desiring the male or the foul desiring the fair, the desire must be attributed not to the foulness itself, as such, but to a subject that is foul or female incidentally.<sup>244</sup>

It is clear from the passages that Aristotle's conceptions are very earth-bound, that is to say, related more to the material and sensible than the ideas of Plato. Aristotle's conception of the imagination relates more to earth, sense experiences and the body, than the inner world of dreams. Although we do imagine in images borrowed from the sensible world, his conception does not explain why we imagine particular images over other images, and what determines the images imagined.

The antithetical ideas of God and the sensible world form the fundamental pair of opposites that Aristotle applied to all his studies. God is pure thought, eternal and most good. When compared to Plato's idea of the opposites, we can see that the concept of soul has more a relationship to matter or the sensible world than the central inner character (idea of God). Plato relates the soul to the inner idea of God and his associated characteristics, whereas Aristotle relates the soul to matter and the physical world.

We may conclude that Aristotle was in general, more aware of the material and sensible world in elaborate and complex ways. The relationship of the soul to God however, is not as distinct. Both Aristotle

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<sup>244</sup> ARISTOTLE, *The Physics*, Vol. I, Book I, #9, page 93.

and Plato conceived of a contrasted couple with a third intermediary form. His conception of God has similar characteristics to that conceived by Plato, the antithetical concept is however, matter. Matter he explains has qualities pertaining to the feminine or female and her desire for the male. In this aspect, his conception has great similarities to Plato's role of gender.

The soul, he explains, has two aspects, one part rational, the other, irrational. The relationship between the soul and mind is for Aristotle secondary to its relationship with the body and sensible world. He writes that the mind can be independent from the soul because the soul is generally bound to the instinctive and sensible functions. Although Aristotle leads us to believe that he is more aware of the sensible and material world, it is difficult to draw a definite conclusion from his writings. We can say however, that his ideas revolve around perception and the emphasis of his philosophy less metaphysical than Plato's.

Aristotle does recognise the opposites and the unifying third form called the soul (anima). The soul in this instance orients around the body and its physical nature rather than God and his psychic nature. It is an excellent example of differing temperaments and how they emphasise one side of reality over the other. Nevertheless, their unity of personality is evident. The ancient Greeks conceived a myriad of deities in their mythology, yet both Plato and Aristotle conceive a single idea they call God with different ideas of soul. The soul in Plato's writings is an authority over the body and closer to God. Aristotle's idea of soul is oriented towards the senses and earth.

#### d. Descartes R. (1596 - 1650)

The Christian church established itself at the later stage of the Roman Empire and dominated the spiritual realm in the west between the philosophies of the ancient world to Descartes in the Renaissance era. Notable exceptions were the Gnostic and Alchemical traditions that remained hidden from the Church for fear of persecution. Descartes lived at a time still dominated by the Christian dogma, and was instrumental in the age of reason and enlightenment. He is the father of modern philosophical thought but had no defined conception of the unconscious. He did however go through a transition and turned away from the darkness of his previous life towards the light of the future.

The beginning of Descartes' philosophical work began with three dreams he experienced on the night of November 10, 1619. The first two dreams were frightening: fierce winds at the forefront of a tremendous thunderstorm blew him from a college to a church, but the wind did not

affect other people he encountered on the way. The third dream was not frightening and Descartes received two books, the first a 'Dictionnaire', the other on poetry called *Corpus Poetarum*, with reference to one particular poem 'Est and Non'. While still asleep Descartes asked himself whether he was dreaming or had had a vision. He not only decided he was dreaming, and began to interpret the earlier part of the dream while still dreaming. The 'Dictionnaire' he decided, stood for all the sciences, while the book of poetry stood for philosophy and wisdom. These dreams were for Descartes a turning point and he left his previous life and devoted the rest of it to creating a unified mathematical science.

It is clear Descartes considered the source of these dreams divine, but did not realise that the dreams came to him through the darkness of sleep and not the light of consciousness. His mind focused from this point on to the eternal, good, and perfect, and his conception of a perfect being. Later in his life, he claimed that dreams express a movement of the organs in sleep, and that they constitute a language translating a desire. As with the ancients, Descartes conceived a complimentary pair of opposites. Understanding to Descartes, has two operations: intuition and deduction. If we examine these operations, we will see an interesting collaboration of opposites emerge.

The fourth edition of the Oxford Dictionary (1967) states that intuition is: "Immediate apprehension of the mind without reasoning; immediate apprehension by sense; immediate insight". Deduction, on the other hand: "Deduce: Infer, draw a conclusion from known or supposed facts", and deduction: "inference from the general to the particular or a priori reasoning". Deduction is a conscious and deliberate act of reasoning whereas intuition is a spontaneous act of knowing characterised by its lack of conscious effort and input. If intuition is not a conscious and a deliberate process, one may infer that it is an unconscious process, that is to say, one is not aware of how it functions.

.....just as these impulses of which I have spoken are found in me, not with-standing that they do not always concur with my will, so perhaps there is in me some faculty fitted to produce these ideas without the assistance of any external things, even though it is not yet known to me; just as, apparently, they have hitherto always been found in me during sleep without the aid of any external objects, .....I have noticed that in many cases there was a great difference between the object and its idea.

And although it may be the case that one idea gives birth to an other idea, that cannot continue to be so indefinitely; for in the end we must reach an idea whose cause shall be so to speak an archetype, in which

the whole reality (or perfection) which so to speak objectively (or by representation) in these ideas is contained formally (and really).<sup>245</sup>

In the previous passage, Descartes describes an idea or archetype that formally contains the whole reality of all other ideas, in other words a container. This is the same idea as Plato's' Receptacle of Becoming.

.....I notice that not only is there a real and positive idea of God or of a being of supreme perfection present to my mind, but also, so to speak, a certain negative idea of nothing, that is, of that which is infinitely removed from any kind of perfection and that I am in a sense something intermediate between God and nought.<sup>246</sup>

Descartes gives this container the name 'nought' and regards it as the counter-pole to the being of supreme perfection. If the Supreme Being represents absolute awareness and perfection, then nought must mean an absence of these, and imperfection and unawareness.

Let us then conceive here that the soul has its principal seat in the little gland which exists in the middle of the brain, from whence it radiates forth through all the remainder of the body by means of the animal spirits,.....<sup>247</sup>

In this passage, Descartes includes an example that explains the physiological mechanism of perception as he sees it. An animal approaches a person and the light reflected from its body depicts two images, one in each of our eyes, and these two images form two others, by means of the optic nerves. The animal spirits radiate towards the gland and the two images unite as one. This explanation seems somewhat unreal when compared to our present-day knowledge of the human body. The idea of the animal spirits and the small gland in the centre of the brain shows a very interesting aspect of Descartes spiritual orientation. His mind was focused strictly on all the higher faculties of understanding and insight; that is to say, towards the all-good and perfect being, yet through his work he attempts to relate his body to his soul, and bond them with a central gland located in the middle of the brain. He continues in the following passage on how the inferior and the superior parts of the soul are incompatible and in conflict.

And it is only in the repugnance which exists between the movements which the body by its animal spirits, and the soul by its will, tend to excite in the gland at the same time, that all the strife which we are in the habit

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<sup>245</sup> DECARTES, Rene, The Essential Descartes, New American Library, 1983, Meditation III, pages 183 and 185.

<sup>246</sup> Ibid, Meditation IV, page 194.

<sup>247</sup> Ibid, The Passions of the Soul, Part I, page 363.

of conceiving to exist between the inferior part of the soul, which we call the sensuous, and the superior which is rational, or as we may say, between the natural appetites and the will, consists.<sup>248</sup>

The description of the lower inferior part of the soul, and the higher rational part, show that Descartes had an awareness of the opposites as they exist in the human being. In this case, however, the opposites are in conflict. One can conclude that Descartes strove for the highest realms of spiritual understanding and consequently denied his natural instincts, which he drove into opposition. When compared to the ideas of Plato and Aristotle, we can see a further differentiation of the soul from Plato relating upward to spirit, and Aristotle, downward to matter, to an idea of soul oriented in both directions. In other words, Descartes understood the potential unity between matter and spirit through the soul but could not reconcile the difference in his soul's attitudes. This stage of our evolution is emphasised in Descartes thinking as he understood, as did the ancients, that reality was made of body, soul and spirit but the quality of these fundamental entities, particularly the soul, was not yet differentiated. The positive and negative orientations of the soul was identified but not reconciled and in conflict.

In summary, Descartes conceived of the opposites and their relationship united by the soul that has its seat in a small gland in the centre of the brain.

<b>Name</b>	<b>Other Names</b>	<b>Characteristics</b>
God		Eternal, good, perfect, positive
Soul (positive)		Superior, rational, will
Soul (negative)		Inferior, sensuous, natural appetites
Nought		Negative, nothing, imperfect

His concept of God as all positive and perfect is similar to the Christian view but his understanding of its opposite less clear. He terms the opposite nought, meaning nothing and this conception indicates that he had an intuitive understanding of something that had no defined characteristics like an empty vessel, which therefore contains nothing. His writings on ideas verify this belief. He traces them back to their source and explains that all ideas are contained in an archetype. He elaborates by saying that the whole of reality (or perfection) in the form of ideas is

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<sup>248</sup> Ibid p.366

contained in this archetype. His conception of the antithesis of God is what we would call the unconscious (nought). This is the same as our contemporary understanding of how we bring our God into consciousness from the darkness of unconsciousness by looking at one's dreams, visions, fantasies and creativity.

Unlike Plato, who regarded the soul oriented towards God and Aristotle oriented towards the physical, Descartes differentiated his idea of soul into positive and negative with a central position between the opposites. This evolution in our understanding of unity took sixteen hundred years in our western culture, and his unity was in conflict. This means that the division of the upper and lower aspects of the personality were not in an agreeable relationship and had not found a common understanding and reconciliation of differences. Like any relationship, there are agreements and disagreements that can lead to conflict. I proceed from the basic tenet that agreement attracts and disagreement repels. In this case, the differentiated soul into positive and negative are in conflict and his unity is in 'potentia' and not reconciled.

#### e. Spinoza B. (1632 -1677)

Spinoza owed a great deal to Descartes for the basis of his own philosophy. He rejected Descartes' idea of a soul divided into positive, negative, and regarded God as an infinite, perfect and a thinking thing. His philosophical system based on the idea that all existence and its laws proceed from God. We can see the similarity between this and Plato's idea of a 'model' and its extension, the 'copy of the model'.

The human mind has no knowledge of the human body, nor does it know it to exist, save through ideas of modifications by which the body is affected.

We neither feel nor perceive any individual things save bodies and modes of thinking.

The idea or knowledge of the human mind is granted in God and follows in God, and is referred to him in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of the human body.

We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of individual things which are outside us.<sup>249</sup>

In the above passage, Spinoza explains how we have no knowledge of the human body or even its existence. This shows his natural

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<sup>249</sup> SPINOZA B, Ethics, Nature and Origin of the Mind, Heron Books, pages 56-63.

temperament for psychic processes and reason over the reality of the physical and material world. He describes all aspects of existence relating to his idea of unity. Being aware of unity is however different to living it.

To understand now what this mode is, which we call soul, how it has its origin from the body, and also how its change depends (only) on the body (which I maintain to be the union of soul and body), we must note:<sup>250</sup>

In this passage, Spinoza discusses the soul coming from the body and soul and body united. Unlike Descartes who recognises the positive and negative aspects of the soul, that is, the higher faculties from the lower natural instincts<sup>251</sup>, Spinoza does not differentiate between soul and body and regards them as closely aligned and united. This is natural for a thinking man with many ideas to feel his soul (feminine side of his nature) in the physical world of the body. It shows an undeveloped relationship between his God and his body and matter in general. In the following passages, Spinoza discusses the background causes of volition and desire.

.....in the first place, that men think themselves free in as much as they are conscious of their volitions and desires, and as they are ignorant of the causes by which they are led to wish and desire, they do not even dream of their existence.<sup>252</sup>

All our endeavours or desires follow from the necessity of our nature.....<sup>253</sup>

God is free from passions, nor is he affected with any emotion of pleasure or pain.<sup>254</sup>

The background cause of human endeavours according to Spinoza pertains to nature and comes about of necessity. He describes this cause as a motivating urge that operates of its own accord and leads us to wish and desire. The interesting point concerning this cause is its lack of conscious control. Although God is the ultimate origin of this cause, he does not partake in its affects. This idea is particular to Spinoza as other ideas of God have definite human qualities of passion. For example, the God of Moses, as well as the ancient Gods of Greece and Rome had frequent bouts of fury and rage.

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<sup>250</sup> SPINOZA B, *The Ethics and Other Works*, Princeton University Press, 1994, D. Of the Human Soul, page 58

<sup>251</sup> This is Descartes' value judgement as the instincts have both positive and negative aspects.

<sup>252</sup> SPINOZA B, *Ethics, Concerning God*, Heron Books page 30.

<sup>253</sup> *Ibid*, *The Strength of Emotions*, Fourth Part, page 191.

<sup>254</sup> *Ibid*, *The Power of the Intellect*, Prop XVII, page 210.

Nothing happens in nature which can be attributed to a defect of it; for nature is always the same and one everywhere,<sup>255</sup>

.....it is quite obvious that the mind understands itself the more, the more it understands the things of nature, it is certain that this part of the method will be more perfect according as the mind understands more things, and will then become most perfect of all when it has regard for and reflects on the knowledge of a most perfect being.

Here I shall only say briefly what I understand by the true good, and at the same time, what the highest good is. To understand this properly, it must be noted that good and bad are said of things only in a certain respect, so that one and the same thing can be called both good and bad according to different respects. The same applies to perfect and imperfect. For nothing, considered in its own nature, will be called perfect or imperfect, especially after we have recognized that everything that happens happens according to the eternal order, and according to certain laws of Nature.<sup>256</sup>

Spinoza's ideas show an awareness of the role unity had in nature, yet his idea only includes perfection. This value judgement of perfection in contrast to imperfection is different to what we normally regard as good or bad. Perfection to Spinoza is an order or a law beyond emotion and the horrors of nature, including human nature, and regarded as a 'mode' or extension of this unity. The opposites of war, death, destruction and peace, life, creativity are all part of this perfection. Perhaps it is a poor choice of words to say what we regard as negative, is part of this perfection. It is definitely part of unity and there is order in this unity. Perfection as a term does however conjure thoughts of good rather than bad. A more complete understanding has to acknowledge that both good and perfection, bad and imperfection, are all part of the idea of unity and this is the nature of reality.

Spinoza goes on to explain that knowledge and understanding of the mind; in other words, self-knowledge, leads to increased understanding of nature. Beyond the knowledge of nature and perfecting the method of self-knowledge, comes reflection and knowledge of God. He does not equate nature with God however, but as an attribute of God or more specifically, God's way of ordering existence. This does not sound like a perfect being to leave his creatures alone to fight it out for survival. He does however give certain advantages to species using caution and protective behaviour or using weapons for hunting and defence.

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<sup>255</sup> Ibid, Origin and Nature of Emotions, Third Part, page 84.

<sup>256</sup> SPINOZA B, The Ethics and Other Works, Princeton University Press, 1994, Preliminaries, page 5



Will can only be called a necessary cause, not a free one.<sup>257</sup>

There is in no mind absolute or free will, but the mind is determined for willing this or that by a cause which is determined in its turn by another cause, and this one again by another, and so on to infinity.<sup>258</sup>

He describes the will having no freedom of its own and determined by a necessary cause and God. For Spinoza everything that happens in existence is a manifestation of God's nature, and with knowledge of God, evil becomes good, when related to a larger and more comprehensive plan. He clearly conceives the unity of God including all that exists in the physical world and so-called perfection of reality beyond good and bad. A differentiation of his thinking may yield a further explanation of his conception of unity. Spinoza identifies and defines the following psychic functions.

**Idea** - I understand a conception of the mind which the mind forms by reason of its being a thinking thing.<sup>259</sup>

**Memory** - It is nothing else than sensation of impressions on the brain accompanied with the thought to determine the duration of the sensation.<sup>260</sup>

**Imagination** - certain fortuitous and unconnected sensations which do not rise from the power of the mind, but from external causes.....Or if one wishes, he may take what ever he likes for imagination, provided he admits it is some- thing different from the understanding and that the soul has a passive relation with it.<sup>261</sup>

**Idea**- Spinoza regards the idea as a conception of the mind that the mind forms. The emphasis is on the idea being a thought rather than an image. Since he regards all existence proceeding from God, so too must all ideas proceed from God? What we consider as ideas today includes images, emotions, judgements, thoughts, but also the ability to build from ideas and transform them. For example, one original idea is the basis for the construction of a city. In Australia, Sydney grew from the idea of a colony where fresh water was available i.e., the Tank stream. Canberra grew from an individual's conception of geometric circular ring roads around a central parliament building.

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<sup>257</sup> SPINOZA B, Ethics, Concerning God, Heron Books, First Part, page 25.

<sup>258</sup> Ibid, Second Part, page 74.

<sup>259</sup> Ibid, Second Part, page 37.

<sup>260</sup> Ibid, Fifth Part, page 254.

<sup>261</sup> Ibid, Fifth Part, page 255.

**Memory-** -Spinoza does not clearly differentiate between sense perception, which is immediate perception of the physical, and memory as a stored set of images and emotions of the original sense perception. The important aspect of memory is its unconsciousness. We forget most of the experiences in life to make way for new perceptions. Consciousness may retrieve these images by focusing on a particular event or impression. The psyche does however, have the ability to associate with past sense perceptions (memories) and relate them to a current perception.

**Imagination-** -Spinoza conceives of the imagination as images that are unconnected with the thinking mind and derived from external causes, that is to say, the images borrowed from the physical world, assembled and presented to our perception (mind's eye). This does not explain how, why and what presents a particular series of images to one's mind. Like dreams, imagination has an obscure meaning based on association. In other words an unconscious ordering system assembles images of objects perceived in the physical world and organises them into a scene and/or story.

Spinoza continues by explaining that imagination could be anything, different from the understanding and that the soul is passive to it. Passivity with respect to imagination means no active role in the imagination and perception of the images as if watching a movie. The passivity towards imagination is typical of an artistic temperament and the expression of images as they occur. On the other hand, it is possible to become a director of the movie, in other words take active part in the flow of images and direct them accordingly. Obviously this is only possible when in a waking state and with the involvement of consciousness. We perceive dreams passively because we are asleep and they always seem to be about ourselves. We not only perceive the dreams but act in them.

From the material presented by Spinoza, we can conceive an idea of the unconscious with its products of ideas, memory and imagination. Both Descartes and Spinoza conceived an all-perfect God, infinite and a thinking thing. Bodies he explains come from God and can only be known through their modes. In bodies, he includes all the material objects in the physical world. Unlike Descartes, his differentiation of soul from the body and awareness of unity is still incomplete. We may consider nature perfect because it follows definite laws, but this does not include the law of attraction and repulsion, which is fundamental to atomic structure, biological evolution and the forces that hold the galaxy together.

## f. Leibniz G. W. (1646 - 1716)

Leibniz's metaphysics is an elaboration of the Cartesian (Descartes) concept of God as divine perfection and does everything in the most desirable way. "God is an absolute perfect being". Leibniz's does however, conceive a God of pure intelligence without senses to perceive matter.<sup>262</sup>

For it will readily be granted that God does not know matter by means of the senses; for it is an axiom in metaphysics that God has no senses and consequently cannot have sensations.....In a word since he is pure intelligence he can conceive only the purely intelligible; not that he is ignorant of any of the phenomenon of nature.....<sup>263</sup>

The idea of a perfect being that does not perceive through senses but through intelligence alone is more like a blind but purposeful force rather than an all seeing creator. This conception of God with no relationship to the body and senses and purely a psychic function means that the reality of the body is not included in Leibniz's idea of unity. Unlike the ancient Gnostics and Alchemists who regarded the spirit within matter and the body as a reality, Leibniz's idea has more in common with the Christian ideal of an all-good and purified spirit. Leibniz attempts to see the underlying function of God without relationship to the individual. God created humans so we could perceive for him, and carry out his work. The idea of a God without a relationship to his creation is like an artist that does not create, which makes him a fantasist, but not an artist.

Leibniz's system of philosophy was in the end an attempt to reconcile the prevailing Christian doctrine with reason (pre-established harmony) and all of God's creation moving towards perfection. In other words if we could see the reason for what we perceive as evil, we would become aware of its purpose and its movement towards perfection. It is true that much of the natural world and its horrors have a purpose that transcends perceived good and evil and moves towards Leibniz's pre-established harmony. What to our feeling seems horrific is in nature, purposeful.

For example, the way a female Praying Mantis devours the male during or after copulation has the purpose of concentrating reproduction and providing nutrients for the mother and offspring. Similarly, when a male lion takes over a pride and kills the cubs of his predecessor, it maximises the new lion's reproductive success. These and other examples show

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<sup>262</sup> If God has the ability to sense, then he would either have to have a body as we do, or sense in another way.

<sup>263</sup> LEIBNIZ G W, Basic Writings, The Open Court Publishing Company, 1962, Introduction, p XVII.

Leibniz's idea of "pre-established harmony" as it occurs in nature and how individuals of a species have ideas with purpose that compel their behaviour. Animals cannot see purpose due to their lack of awareness and questioning ability of the compelling idea. Humans on the other hand, are aware to some extent, of the motivating forces behind behaviour. We are still in most instances at the mercy of these compelling forces and simply follow their impetus without criticism.<sup>264</sup>

Leibniz shows that the psychic and physical are not only united but have intelligence (meaning) underlying their unity. He draws the distinction between the conception of the extension and three-dimensionality of a body, and substance of the body. The body has in his viewpoint something like a soul. This concept of matter carries the earlier viewpoint of the Cartesians to where matter relates to what one would call spirit or all the attributes that Leibniz calls God. He equates the rational soul with mind thus reinforcing Descartes' idea of an upper and lower soul.

Relating a concept of a higher being to the everyday things in the physical world, has always been a great problem for philosophers. How does one relate the great ideas and forces that guide our destinies with the objects and life in the physical world?

Ideas are all stored up within us. Plato's doctrine of reminiscence.....as a matter of fact our soul has the power of representing to itself any form or nature whenever the occasion comes for thinking about it, and I think that this activity of our soul is, so far as it expresses some nature, form or essence, properly the idea of the thing. This is in us, and is always in us whether we are thinking of it or no. This position is in accord with my principles that naturally nothing enters our minds from outside..... Nothing can be taught us of which we have not already in our minds the idea.<sup>265</sup>

Leibniz distinguishes between the idea and essence of something, in this case the soul, and the thing itself, the body. His relationship between the idea of the body and the body itself is tenuous however. This shows that Leibniz was aware of the idea of the body, but not the body itself.

A body is an aggregation of substances, and is not a substance, properly speaking. Consequently in all bodies must be found indivisible substances which cannot be generated and are not corruptible, having something which corresponds to souls.<sup>266</sup>

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<sup>264</sup> Our warlike nature is an example of such inner forces.

<sup>265</sup> LEIBNIZ G W, Basic Writings, Metaphysics, p44.

<sup>266</sup> Ibid, p.244.

Intellects or souls which are capable of reflection and of knowing the eternal truths and God, have many privileges that exempt them from the transformations of bodies.<sup>267</sup>

The building blocks of matter, which he calls Monads, are indivisible and have a soul.<sup>268</sup> He explains that Monads are simple substances, meaning without parts and made up of composites. They are incorruptible, self-contained and closed. Each Monad is different from the other and the natural changes they go through come from an internal principle, and external causes have no influence upon its inner being. The Monad that Leibniz speaks about is very much akin to the Mandala as a symbol of wholeness.<sup>269</sup>

The passing condition which involves and represents a multiplicity in the unity or in the simple substance a plurality of conditions and relations, even though it has no parts. The passing condition which involves and represents a multiplicity in the unity, or in the simple substance, is nothing else than what is called perception. This should be carefully distinguished from Apperception or consciousness as will appear in what follows. In this matter the Cartesians have fallen into a serious error, in that they treat as non-existent those perceptions of which we are not conscious. It is this also which has led them to believe that spirits alone are Monads and that there are no souls of animals or other Entelechies, and it has led them to make the common confusion between a protracted period of unconsciousness and actual death. They have thus adapted the Scholastic error that souls can exist entirely separated from bodies, and have even confirmed ill-balanced minds in the belief that souls are mortal.<sup>270</sup>

Leibniz elaborates in this preceding passage on the unity of the Monad and the idea that it changes itself from inside. This concept seems very strange when compared to our present-day knowledge of matter. Are we to interpret this as an idea of the constituents of matter that has nothing to do with matter itself? In other words, is it an idea of matter? If we accept this conception as a projected idea into matter, the whole emphasis of Leibniz's philosophy changes. Instead of looking at matter to find Leibniz's idea, we look at the idea itself and then relate it to matter.

To make the idea of the Monad clearer, the characteristics of it are summarised as follows:

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<sup>267</sup> Ibid, p.245.

<sup>268</sup> See Chapter 2 on Animism

<sup>269</sup> Sanskrit for circle. Jung refers to it extensively and considers it to be a symbol of wholeness.

<sup>270</sup> LEIBNIZ G W, Basic Writings, Metaphysics, p.253, par.14.

<b>Name</b>	<b>Other Names</b>	<b>Characteristics</b>
Monad	Souls, Soul plus Memory = Monad	Simple substance; makes up composites; without parts; no window; closed to outside; each different; changes come from an internal principle; not affected by external causes; has a manifoldness which changes; has a multiplicity in the unity; has something inside which changes and something which unchanges.

The major characteristics are autonomy from external causes, its simplicity, its unity and closed nature, its multiplicity and containing the opposites of change and un-change within it. This conception may lead us to wonder where all this information about the Monad came from. Is this idea something in the material world? Is Leibniz describing something completely different to what we know as matter? The description Leibniz gives is unmistakably close to the description of a Mandala. We can only speculate that the Monad may be a projected Mandala into the physical world of object and body. In other words, his unity is found in the material world of matter and body.

In the following passage, Leibniz highlights perception as a fundamental aspect of the Monad, perception being a function of the senses in matter (body).

If we wish to designate as soul everything which has perceptions and desires in the general sense that I have just explained, all simple substances or created Monads could be called souls. But since feeling is something more than a mere perception I think that the general name of Monad or Entelechy should suffice for simple substances which have only perception, while we may reserve the term soul for those whose perception is more distinct and is accompanied by memory.<sup>271</sup>

Leibniz explains how memory, when added to the Monad as a simple substance, become 'souls'. A simple substance that relies on perception

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<sup>271</sup> Ibid, p.255, par.19.

alone he calls a Monad. When we add memory to the simple substance, it brings with it a feeling and elevates the Monad too more than a simple substance, a soul. In other words, memory is life experience of the past. With more memory, the Monad becomes real in the physical world just like a child that grows and becomes aware of themselves and surrounding environment.

The memory furnishes a sought of consecutiveness which imitates reason it is to be distinguished from it. We see that animals when they have a perception of something which they notice and of which they have had a similar previous perception, are led by the representation of their memory to expect that which was associated in the preceding perception, and they come to have feelings like those which they had before.<sup>272</sup>

Let us now look at the whole picture that Leibniz is painting. We have the concept of a complete and united substance he calls a Monad. The Monad's main characteristic is sense perception. He then adds memory to the Monad, which in turn creates a soul and relationship (feeling) to the physical world. Having identified senses, memory and feeling belonging to the concept of soul, we must ask the question, where does thinking and intuition fit into the picture?

But the knowledge of eternal and necessary truths is that which distinguishes us from mere animals and gives us reason and the sciences, thus raising us to a knowledge of ourselves and of God. This is what is called in us the Rational Soul or Mind.<sup>273</sup>

Leibniz continues:

It is also through the knowledge of necessary truths and through abstractions from them that we come to perform Reflective Acts, which cause us to think of what is called the I. and to decide that this or that is within us. It is thus, that in thinking upon ourselves we think of being, of substance, of the simple and composite, of a material thing and of God himself, conceiving that what is limited in us is in him without limits. These reflective Acts furnish the principle objects of our reasonings.<sup>274</sup>

In the preceding passages, it is clear that Leibniz considers the rational soul and all the higher faculties of reason, reflection, will and thinking distinguished from the instinctive nature of the animals. We achieve this by gaining knowledge of the eternal truths, which in turn gives us knowledge of ourselves and of God. Leibniz thus described all aspects of existence from the lowliest animals to the most perfect being. He sees

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<sup>272</sup> Ibid, p.256, par.26.

<sup>273</sup> Ibid, p.257, par.29.

<sup>274</sup> Ibid, p.257, par.30.

the animals as possessing the simplest Monad characterised by perception. With the addition of feeling, the Monad changes to a multiplicity in its internal structure and approaches the infinite and perfect, which gives knowledge of God. Yet God has no ability to perceive through senses.

In God are present: power, which is the source of everything; knowledge, which contains the details of the ideas; and finally, will, which changes or produces things in accordance with the principle of greatest good. To these correspond in the created Monad, the subject or basis, the faculty of perception, and the faculty of appetite. In God these attributes are absolutely infinite or perfect, while in the created Monads,.....they are imitations approaching him in proportion to the perfection.<sup>275</sup>

The philosophy of Leibniz has the observational properties and insights into psychological truths of human nature. Although his concepts have a metaphysical cloak draped over them, they are very much akin to the objective observations and discoveries of the twentieth century psychologists. Leibniz attempts to fit all functions of the human being into a comprehensive and total concept called the Monad. This Monad ranges from a simple form of the animals, to the infinite and perfect Monad of God.

The beauty of Leibniz's philosophy is its idea of unity including all existence from God to matter in one concept. As with the Cartesians and post Cartesians, Leibniz attempts to relate matter to God, and manages to contain them in one idea, which the Cartesians could not do. His idea of matter is still not complete however, because God cannot have sensations. The difficulty lies in relating the sensible, imperfect world to an all-perfect being. It mustn't have occurred to him that if God created all, including imperfect or undeveloped souls, then God himself must have imperfection within himself, for a God is not perfect if he creates imperfection.

#### g. Rousseau J. J. (1712 - 1778)

In many ways Rousseau lived what he preached and whether consciously or unconsciously, sought what he called 'the natural man'. He sought the uniqueness of himself as an individual in contrast to the collective and civilised man. He speaks at length about his isolation and thoughts that preoccupied him, his relationship to the society he once lived in and giving himself to his destiny.

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<sup>275</sup> Ibid, p.261, par.48.



Drawn, I know not how, from the order of things, I have seen myself precipitated into an incomprehensible chaos, in which I perceive nothing at all, and the more I think of my present state, the less I can understand where I am.<sup>276</sup>

They have torn from my heart all the sweetness of society.....All is ended for me upon the earth; none can now do me good or evil. There remains for me neither anything to hope for nor to fear in this world, and now I am tranquil at the bottom of the gulf, a poor unfortunate mortal, but as undisturbed as God himself.<sup>277</sup>

Rousseau's journey to the underworld (unconscious) gave him a unique and individual viewpoint on the society he had left behind. He had to contend with the chaos of conflicting impulses and instincts characteristic of that submersion and derived a system that reinforced his animal nature. Indeed, it is his individuality and all the natural instincts, which Rousseau sought.

These hours of solitude and meditation are the only ones of the day in which I am fully myself and for myself without diversion, without obstacle, and where I can truly say I am that which nature has designed.<sup>278</sup>

His urge to become natural, instinctive and of the heart did have its negative consequences. His viewpoint was not well received by the French authorities although the idea of the 'natural man' was an important problem for the civilised man at the time. To live without moral constraint and by nature alone is for many a personal horror and leaves oneself vulnerable to persecution, imprisonment or even death, as the fate of Socrates shows. He was wise to remove himself from his culture to explore that side of his nature.

I saw myself at the decline of an innocent and unfortunate life; the soul still full of lively sentiments, and the spirit still ornamented with some flowers, but already withered by sadness and dried up in ennui. Alone and abandoned, I felt the chill of the first frosts, and my failing imagination did not people my solitude any more with beings formed according to my own heart. I said to myself with a sigh: What have I done here on earth? I was made for living, and I am dying, without having lived.<sup>279</sup>

As a learned man, Rousseau risked his life in an exploration of the natural man, which in the end was not his own choice. Fate often selects

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<sup>276</sup> ROUSSEAU J J, *The Reveries of a Solitary, First Promenade*, p.32.

<sup>277</sup> *Ibid*, *First Promenade*, p.35.

<sup>278</sup> *Ibid*, *Second Promenade*, p.43.

<sup>279</sup> *Ibid*, *Second Promenade*, p.46.

individuals to carry the compensatory burden of a one-sided culture and be its antithesis for the sake of unity. Many a poet and philosopher lived a compensatory life and carried this burden for the unity of their culture. Some manage to work their way through the turmoil of unconsciousness and come out the other side with renewed optimism for life and express their newfound insight into human nature. Experience of the unconscious and the natural man has the highest value for a repressed culture. Thinking about it alone is mere speculation.

An absolute silence leads to sadness, it offers us an image of death; thus the help of a light-hearted imagination is necessary and presents itself naturally to those whom the heavens have gratified with it. The movement, which does not come from without, then, is made within us.....<sup>280</sup>

Rousseau speaks of entering himself and finding true happiness independent of any outside influence. It is towards the darkness of death, a place that is cold and alone, void of people and of the spirit. His spirit did not guide him back from the world of darkness to the light, and Rousseau ended his days mad and poor.

How have I come to this?.....Indignation, fury, delirium seized upon me; I lost my direction. My head was turned and in the horrible darkness in which men have not ceased to keep me plunged, I perceived neither a gleam to guide me, nor a support, nor a foothold to stand firmly on and to resist the despair which carried me away.<sup>281</sup>

As Rousseau's inward journey developed, he writes about the antithetical opposites of Religion and Science. He explains how humanity is on a journey from the religious attitude to the scientific, by means of the vices. He believes that sciences such as physics came from idle curiosity, astronomy from superstition and moral philosophy from human pride, and as we liberate ourselves from the darkness of our origins, we slowly discover the sciences, but in so doing, lose sight of the very darkness at the basis of religion. This darkness, he explains, is where we all came from, and the darkness we all go into upon death. Science itself is striving somehow to overcome this most definite and determined scenario.

Science extends itself, and religion decays. All the world are for teaching how to act well, but nobody is willing to learn. We are all in fact all become scholars, and have ceased to be Christians.<sup>282</sup>

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<sup>280</sup> Ibid, Fifth Promenade, p.115.

<sup>281</sup> Ibid, Eighth Promenade, p.158

<sup>282</sup> Ibid, Part the Second, p.64.

Had the destined man to be healthy, I could almost venture to declare that a state of reflection is a state contrary to nature, and that a thinking man is a depraved animal. When we think on the good constitution of the savages, at least of those whom we have not ruined by our spirituous liquors; and reflect that they are troubled with hardly any disorders, but such as are caused by wounds on old age; we must be in a manner convinced that the history of human diseases must be confined to that of civil society.<sup>283</sup>

There is no doubt that we have entered a scientific age and that the darkness (unconscious) we all came from has a low level of interest to the rational and reasoned mind. Rousseau's attitude towards science is negative and can be understood as reinforcement and sustaining his inner journey. In this instance, Rousseau has an opposite stance to the ancient view that the body and associated instincts require overcoming and are evil. He embraced the body and instincts for a closer understanding of human nature, and indeed, this is the only way we can liberate the spirit within matter by going in and getting it. This is why he sees the physical world and its study as negative. It requires dismemberment, boiling and transformation in the alchemical tradition, to emerge renewed in the third stance, and free of the opposites.

Rousseau also touches on the antithesis of thought and the instincts, and how humanity in his epoch, compared themselves to the savages, which were full of disorders and disease due to their depraved instinctuality. As with Leibniz, Rousseau describes the lower animals as oriented by the senses. The difference between the animals and humans, in his view, is only a matter of degree. He rightly explains that we are all sensible of the same instinctive impulses; some are at liberty to resist these impulses, reinforced by the prevailing laws in the culture. The problem with Rousseau's exploration of the natural man is that instincts can be positive and negative and the urge to love is not far from the urge to kill. For an individual to step into their instinctive background requires the isolation that Rousseau suffered, and is recommended to avoid the natural misalignment that arises between instinct, culture and law.

This is one of the biggest problems individuals suffer when confronted with the reality of their own nature. When a lion kills another's cubs, we say it is nature at work. When an individual kills another, we put them in a cage or kill them, thus taking away their liberty or life. We do not regard it as human nature but a violation of law. Yet, when a nation invades another and kills millions of people, we accept it because we declared

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<sup>283</sup> Ibid, Part the Second, p.174.

war and there are generally no consequences for the invading nation.<sup>284</sup> The rule of law is a necessity for a functioning society, but is still enforced by power and force, which is in itself, the law of the jungle.

Rousseau describes the unconscious as dark, cold, chaotic, incomprehensible, isolated, at the bottom of a gulf, no existence except memories, inside himself, his heart, dying absolute silence, in delirium, no guide or support and finally the realm of instinct. The madness involved is understood, and so too the underlying unity of the opposites. Unfortunately, he could not solve the conflict between instinct and civil society and did not find that spirit that could reconcile the opposites and guide him back to the world.

#### h. Kant I. (1724 - 1804)

Kant was an academic philosopher who founded German idealism. His life was outwardly uneventful and he kept a regular and orderly schedule. He did not marry, so did not experience the pleasure and pain of a wife and family. The main emphasis of his philosophy was the subject over the object of cognition. Indeed his basic premise was that the only true reality is the cognition of matter, not matter itself. To Kant cognition is the 'a priori' idea of matter, in other words, the idea of matter. He emphasises the reality of the subject of cognition, which agrees with the psychological insights in the twentieth century.<sup>285</sup> The truth of this human functioning can be emphasised by the way people see the same object differently. For example, some people can see an object very clearly and make no assumptions of its reality, whereas an object impresses others only if it touches them inside in some way. This psychological fact is further emphasised when we reach the boundaries of our knowledge as the ancients showed when they projected their Gods onto the planets in the solar system. Matter itself has also become less distinct and more curious since physicists showed that it is predominately space with particles held in position by electromagnetic forces. In addition, particles such as electrons behave in unpredictable ways and do not conform to known laws.

Kant demonstrates his observation on the nature of cognition in the following passage, and the idea of an object as the only true reality for the subject. This reality varies however, depending on the individual and their particular typology.

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<sup>284</sup> I refer to the invasion of nations such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya etc., led by the United States.

<sup>285</sup> I refer to the observations made by the Analytical Psychologists, which agree with this premise.

Nothing here can escape us, because what reason brings forth entirely out of itself cannot be hidden, but is brought to light by reason itself as soon as reason's common principle has been discovered. The perfect unity of this kind of cognition, and the fact that it arises solely out of pure concepts without any influence that would extend or increase it from experience or even particular intuition, which would lead to a determinate experience, make this unconditioned completeness not only feasible but also necessary.<sup>286</sup>

The following emphasises Kant's observation of the inner processes of cognition as independent of the empirical, sensible or physical world and a unity in itself. He also points to the connection between constituents around and within the unity that makes the central idea of the whole. In other words, Kant is aware of the inner processes of cognition and that all the inner characters (constituents) involved are oriented around a central idea or character.

This Analytic is the analysis of the entirety of our a priori cognition into the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding. It is concerned with the following points: **1.** That the concepts be pure and not empirical concepts. **2.** That they belong not to intuition and to sensibility, but rather to thinking and understanding. **3.** That they be elementary concepts, and clearly distinguished from those which are derived or composed from them. **4.** That the table of them be complete, and that they entirely exhaust the entire field of pure understanding. Now this completeness of a science cannot reliably be assumed from a rough calculation of an aggregate put together by mere estimates; hence it is possible only by means of an **idea of the whole** of the *a priori* cognition of the understanding, and through the division of concepts that such an idea determines and that constitutes it, thus only through their **connection in a system**. The pure understanding separates itself completely not only from everything empirical, but even from all sensibility. It is therefore a unity that subsists on its own, which is sufficient by itself, and which is not to be supplemented by any external additions.<sup>287</sup>

Kant's recognition of this central idea independent of the empirical, sensible and physical world shows his limitation in experience of the unity of the psychic and physical. This may be due to his abstracting the contents from the psyche and stripping away the personal or relational aspect of the inner characters, thus making them sterile. It's as if one were to look at the skeletal structure of a building and ignore the colour contour, line, rhythm etc., not to mention the personalities of the designer and eventual occupants.

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<sup>286</sup> KANT Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press, 1998, Page 104

<sup>287</sup> Ibid, Page 201

Different representations are brought under one concept analytically (a business treated by general logic). Transcendental logic, however, teaches how to bring under concepts not the representations but the pure synthesis of representations. The first thing that must be given to us a priori for the cognition of all objects is the manifold of pure intuition; the synthesis of this manifold by means of the imagination is the second thing, but it still does not yield cognition. The concepts that give this pure synthesis unity, and that consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity, are the third thing necessary for cognition of an object that comes before us, and they depend on the understanding.<sup>288</sup>

In this passage, Kant describes the idea of an object as distinct from the object itself. He goes through his process, with pure intuition in the first instance, imagination in the second and its relation to the unity in the third, before one can cognise an object. The process seems to be an internal one for Kant contrasted to the usual way we study an object by using our senses through measurement, comparison, weighing, microscopy etc. I am not sure if intuition and imagination of an object can yield any truth about its nature alone. All this can do is to provide an idea of an object, which may have no relationship to that object itself, just what one imagines it to be. For any true cognisance of an object requires a relationship to that object as Kant himself hints at in the following passage.

Thus whatever and however much our concept of an object may contain, we have to go out beyond it in order to provide it with existence. With objects of sense this happens through the connection with some perception of mine in accordance with empirical laws; but for objects of pure thinking there is no means whatever for cognizing their existence, because it would have to be cognized entirely a priori, but our consciousness of all existence (whether immediately through perception or through inferences connecting something with perception) belongs entirely and without exception to the unity of experience, and though an existence outside this field cannot be declared absolutely impossible, it is a presupposition that we cannot justify through anything.<sup>289</sup>

Kant differentiates the idea of an object with the object itself through the connection or relationship between them. He admits that abstract ideas (objects of pure thinking) have no relationship to the object and impossible to show their existence. In other words, psychic contents are unprovable because the individual perceives them alone without the unity of experience. For example, the idea of God as an inner character can only be perceived by the individual through dreams, visions etc., and

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<sup>288</sup> Ibid, Page 211

<sup>289</sup> Ibid, Page 349

studied, brought closer to consciousness through that inner material. The idea that God speaks to us every night in our dreams is to some ludicrous. This is because they do not understand God's language. This and other characters are 'objects of pure thinking'<sup>290</sup> and their only relationship to the physical object is that they borrow images and ideas from the physical world to communicate their symbolic desire to become conscious in the individual. The problem with psychic products is the subject perceives them and no one else does. We can, however, see the workings of another person's psyche through communication and behaviour, as well as artistic expression, written word and so on.

Transcendental philosophy is here only an idea for which the critique of pure reason is to outline the entire plan architectonically, i.e., from principles,' with a full guarantee for the completeness and certainty of all the components that comprise this edifice. That this critique is not itself already called transcendental philosophy rests solely on the fact that in order to be a complete system it would also have to contain an exhaustive analysis of all of human cognition a priori.<sup>291</sup>

This passage describes his critique as a metaphor of a building and its structure. The 'components of this edifice' are none other than an individual's psychic functions and the detail of their operation and how they fit into the unity of his system. The idea that these functions are self-contained and belong to a unity shows his awareness of that unity. It is unclear however, to what extent his idea of unity is differentiated.

It is therefore a unity that subsists on its own, which is sufficient by itself, and which is not to be supplemented by any external additions. Hence the sum total of its cognition will constitute a system that is to be grasped and determined under one idea, the completeness and articulation of which system can at the same time yield a touchstone of the correctness and genuineness of all the pieces of cognition fitting into it.<sup>292</sup>

Transcendental philosophy has the advantage but also the obligation to seek its concepts in accordance with a principle since they spring pure and unmixed from the understanding, as absolute unity, and must therefore be connected among themselves in accordance with a concept or idea. Such a connection, however, provides a rule by means of which the place of each pure concept of the understanding and the completeness of all of them together can be determined a priori, which would otherwise depend upon whim or chance.<sup>293</sup>

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<sup>290</sup> This is a poor use of the term 'object' as this usually refers to something physical.

<sup>291</sup> KANT Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press, 1998, Page 134

<sup>292</sup> Ibid, Page 201

<sup>293</sup> Ibid, Page 204

Kant's idea of unity is a closed system which he regards as: 'sufficient by itself', which raises a doubt as to its level of differentiation. Sufficient by itself shows that he is aware of other functions that could be included, but decided not to add more 'external additions'. He does recognise that his philosophy and its components are 'connected among themselves', which hints at the function of relationship between the concepts. In psychological terms, relationship for a man like Kant is the feminine function of soul (anima). He also hints at the unpredictability of the connection by stating that:

All judgments are accordingly functions of unity among our representations, since instead of an immediate representation a higher one, which comprehends this and other representations under itself, is used for the cognition of the object, and many possible cognitions are thereby drawn together into one. We can, however, trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments, so that the **understanding** in general can be represented as a **faculty for judging**.<sup>294</sup>

He elaborates on his understanding of the relationships between 'many possible cognitions being drawn together into unity by the faculty of judging. In other words, it is the function of attraction or repulsion or in simple terms, that of feeling. We can view this judging function directly in one's dreams and fantasies and there is no need for 'a priori' reasoning when doing so. In that respect, observation of unconscious products is the same as observing objects in the physical world. One looks inside for the former and outside for the latter. Kant also hints at a higher function, which 'comprehends this and other representations under itself' in the cognition of an object. Whatever that function may be for Kant is unclear but he does give some indication of its order and characteristics as follows:

If we abstract from all content of a judgment in general, and attend only to the mere form of the understanding in it, we find that the function of thinking in that can be brought under four titles, each of which contains under itself three moments. They can suitably be represented in the following table.<sup>295</sup>

**1.**  
**Quantity of Judgements**  
Universal  
Particular  
Singular

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<sup>294</sup> Ibid, Page 205

<sup>295</sup> Ibid, Page 206



**2.**  
**Quality**  
Affirmative  
Negative  
Infinite

**3.**  
**Relation**  
Categorical  
Hypothetical  
Disjunctive

**4.**  
**Modality**  
Problematic  
Assertoric  
Apodictic

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In the above, Kant abstracts characteristics of his 'higher function' of judgement and places it in a table forming a quaternary pattern called 'Titles'. This fourfold pattern further divided into three 'moments' describing the characteristics of each 'title'. I am not too concerned in this study with Kant's categories of judgement, as there is a great deal of subjective interpretation involved. It is important to note that the categories are placed in an orderly fourfold unified pattern, which is in some instances recognition of the fourfold nature of the orienting functions of Plato and later Jung. Kant however, brings the auspices of judgement under his thinking and strips away any personal content, thus robbing it of further evolution and life.

Transcendental logic, how ever, teaches how to bring under concepts not the representations but the **pure synthesis** of representations. The first thing that must be given to us a priori for the cognition of all objects is the **manifold** of pure intuition; the **synthesis** of this manifold by means of the imagination is the second thing, but it still does not yield cognition. The concepts that give this pure synthesis **unity**, and that consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity, are the third thing necessary for cognition of an object that comes before us, and they depend on the understanding.<sup>297</sup>

### **Table of Categories**

**1.**  
**Of Quantity**  
Unity  
Plurality  
Totality

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<sup>296</sup> Ibid, Page 206

<sup>297</sup> Ibid, Page 211

**2.**  
**Of Quality**  
Reality  
Negation  
Limitation

**3.**  
**Of Relation**  
Of Inherence and Subsistence  
(substantia et accidens)  
Of Causality and Dependence  
(Cause and Effect)  
Of Community (reciprocity  
between agent and patient)

**4.**  
**Of Modality**  
Possibility - Impossibility  
Existence – Non-Existence  
Necessity - Contingency

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For the sake of primary concepts it is therefore still necessary to remark that the categories, as the true **ancestral concepts** of pure understanding, also have their equally pure **derivative concepts**, which could by no means be passed over in complete system of transcendental philosophy, but with the mere mention of which I can be satisfied in a merely critical essay<sup>299</sup>.

Kant represents the four functions in a quaternary pattern with the same main titles, namely Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality. If we relate these titles to Plato's cosmology and Jung's typology, we arrive at something that does not quite fit, as he mentions in the following passage. They are Quantity/ Air/ Thinking; Quality/ Fire (water)/ Intuition (Feeling); Relation/ Water/ Feeling & Modality/ Earth/ Sensation. The anomaly may be due to his system oriented toward the object rather than the subject. In other words, Kant is quite aware of his intuitive function and regards that as an inner function, which of course it is<sup>300</sup>. It can, however be oriented towards the object rather than subject, making it like unconscious guesses of possibilities in the world rather than guesses of possibilities within. In addition, Kant regards the categories as 'ancestral concepts', which is akin to the myth-making unconscious or collective unconscious as Jung terms it.

Now this concept cannot contain any determinate intuition at all, and therefore concerns nothing but that unity which must be encountered in a manifold of cognition insofar as it stands in relation to an object. This

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<sup>298</sup> Ibid, page 212

<sup>299</sup> Ibid, page 213

<sup>300</sup> Intuition is an inner (unconscious) function of perception and may be directed inward to characters and ideas, or outward towards the physical world.

relation, however, is nothing other than the necessary unity of consciousness, thus also of the synthesis of the manifold through a common function of the mind for combining it in one representation. Now since this unity must be regarded as necessary a priori (since the cognition would otherwise be without an object), the relation to a transcendental object, i.e., the objective reality of our empirical cognition, rests on the transcendental law that all appearances, insofar as objects are to be given to us through them, must stand under a priori rules of their synthetic unity, in accordance with which their relation in empirical intuition is alone possible, i.e., that in experience they must stand under conditions of the necessary unity of apperception just as in mere intuition they must stand under the formal conditions of space and time; indeed, it is through those conditions that every cognition is first made possible.<sup>301</sup>

Determinate intuition is not included in his categories and Kant has an exclusive attitude towards it. Intuition is one of the irrational functions that simply happens. An idea, thought, image and the like, pops into one's mind of its own accord and its origin generally unknown. It is a form of spontaneous apprehension given, rather than derived. The function of intuition can be bi-directional toward the object and physical world or the subject of ideas and inner characters. It is highly problematic to understand because of its unconscious origins. With this in mind, Kant shows that intuition belongs to his transcendental laws, in-built (a priori) knowledge and synthetic unity. He continues his description of the transcendental unity and intuition:

This principle holds a priori, and can be called **the transcendental principle of the unity** of all the manifold of our representations (thus also in intuition). Now the unity of the manifold in a subject is synthetic; pure apperception therefore yields a principle of the synthetic unity of the manifold in all possible intuition.<sup>302</sup>

The unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of the imagination **is the** understanding, and this very same unity, in relation to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, is the pure understanding.<sup>303</sup>

Kant's viewpoint of his synthetic unity is for him the basis of all understanding and he therefore only has eyes for the inner workings of perception. In other words, he does not differentiate between himself and the way he perceives reality. He does recognise the in-built ideas behind perception of the object but does not recognise their own objectivity and regards them as his own functioning in contrast to what the ancients would have regarded as the 'Gods' functioning. For example, if one feels

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<sup>301</sup> KANT Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press, 1998, page 234

<sup>302</sup> Ibid, page 237

<sup>303</sup> Ibid, page 238

love, is it I that loves or is it an inner character that gives me the feeling of love<sup>304</sup>? This is the level of objectivity possible and necessary when dealing with inner ideas and characters. The reason this objectivity is important is because some inner characters are less than benevolent and possession by them is detrimental to one's health and the health of others.

The objective unity of all (empirical) consciousness in one consciousness (of original apperception) is thus the necessary condition even of all possible perception, and the affinity of all appearances (near or remote) is a necessary consequence of a synthesis in the imagination that is grounded a priori on rules.<sup>305</sup>

Again, Kant emphasises the perceiving subject and idea of the 'empirical object' as the 'necessary condition' of all perception.

Thus as exaggerated and contradictory as it may sound to say that the understanding is itself the source of the laws of nature, and thus of the formal unity of nature, such an assertion is nevertheless correct and appropriate to the object, namely experience.<sup>306</sup>

The preceding passage is an important clarification by Kant and a simple description of what is a psychological truth. In this passage, he sees the relationship between the laws of nature and the laws of our own nature (transcendental unity). We can see this in the way bees have an innate idea of how to construct their intricate hives and the ritualistic behaviour of birds and fish, particularly when mating.<sup>307</sup> It is the same with flora and their intricate methods of attraction and repulsion. It is something that is contained within the species 'a priori' and humans also function in this way. This is why the 'man versus nature' argument is superfluous and the idea we can go beyond our own nature is a fantasy rather than a fact. This recognition also helps us understand why we are the way we are, and why we still have such murderous impulses and need control over others. In that respect, we are no different from the male lion in a pride or the shark looking for its next meal.

Synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions, as given a priori, is thus the ground of the identity of apperception itself, which precedes a priori all **my** determinate thinking.<sup>308</sup>

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<sup>304</sup> This obviously depends on ones typology and personal circumstances.

<sup>305</sup> KANT Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press, 1998, page 240

<sup>306</sup> Ibid, page 242

<sup>307</sup> For example, Bowerbirds make nests to attract a mate and the Puffer fish makes an intricate Mandala like pattern on the sea floor to attract a mate.

<sup>308</sup> KANT Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press, 1998, page 248

Kant explains how his intuitions give him knowledge and precede his thinking (idea) of the object.

The **transcendental unity** of apperception is that unity through which all of the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object. It is called **objective** on that account, and must be distinguished from the **subjective unity** of consciousness, which is a **determination of inner sense**, through which that manifold of intuition is empirically given for such a combination.<sup>309</sup>

Kant expands his idea of unity and describes the different types as he sees them. Perhaps he was premature in the use of the term 'unity' because when there are many unities involved they are not a unity in themselves but a component of unity. This is similar to Leibniz's monad, which also had multiple expressions. It is as if Kant struggles to place all the functions of his personality into a whole but cannot quite bring it all together. He recognises that each constituent is connected to an overall unity but cannot see how they are connected and what relationship they have with each other. His poor attitude to women and the feminine principal and the lack of personal interpretation kept him limited to the intellectual understanding of reality.

He does however recognise that all of his differing forms of unity have a 'totality' as shown in the next passage. This totality he regards as time. This is an indication that Kant finds his totality (overall unity) in the physical world of time. In other words, physical world of objects and people that exist in time are for Kant the opposite of his synthetic unity and part of the totality of his personality. Time belongs to the physical in that its cycle is self-evident and known. Inner ideas, characters, fantasies, etc., exist beyond time and space as they put us in situations that do not comply with the physical laws. We can fly, jump from place to place, find ourselves in unusual situations one second and others the next.

There is only one totality in which all of our representations are contained, namely inner sense and its a priori form, time. The synthesis of representations rests on the imagination, but their synthetic unity (which is requisite for judgment), on the unity of apperception.<sup>310</sup>

Kant expands on this recognition in the following passage where he identifies the opposites of 'phenomena' and 'noumena'. This passage shows that the Noumena is a prerequisite for judgement and regards it as an objective reality. He expands this concept and divides the world into sense(s) and understanding.

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<sup>309</sup> Ibid, page 250

<sup>310</sup> Ibid, page 281

Now one might have thought that the concept of appearances, limited by the Transcendental Aesthetic, already yields by itself the objective reality of the **noumena** and justifies the division of objects into **phenomena** and **noumena**, thus also the division of the world into a world of the senses and of the understanding (**mundus sensibilis & intelligibilis**), indeed in such a way that the difference here would not concern merely the logical form of the indistinct or distinct cognition of one and the same thing, but rather the difference between how they can originally be given to our cognition, in accordance with which they are in them selves different species.<sup>311</sup>

The important aspect of Kant's division of the world into opposites is that he regards 'Noumena' having an objective reality. Indeed this is an important viewpoint in that the products of the unconscious do have an objective reality. For example, dreams come to us while asleep without conscious input or control. They happen of their own accord and in their own way. Similarly, we project inner characters and ideas onto the 'phenomenal' world, which connects us to that world. This is the unity relationship between the Noumenal and Phenomenal halves of reality. It is curious that Kant would view them as 'different species' as they are indispensable to each other and intricately related.

Nevertheless, if we call certain objects, as appearances, beings of sense (**phenomena**), because we distinguish the way in which we intuit them from their constitution in itself, then it already follows from our concept that to these we as it were oppose, as objects thought merely through the understanding, either other objects conceived in accordance with the latter constitution, even though we do not intuit it in them, or else other possible things, which are not objects of our senses at all, and call these beings of understanding (**noumena**).<sup>312</sup>

In the preceding passage Kant uses the term 'beings' of understanding which hints at the possible awareness of the inner myth-making characters behind understanding. He does, however understand the way the Phenomenal and Noumenal interact by introducing a third function in the following passage:

Now all pure concepts have to do generally with the synthetic unity of representations, but concepts of pure reason (transcendental ideas) have to do with the unconditioned synthetic unity of all conditions in general. Consequently, all transcendental ideas will be brought under **three classes**, of which the first contains the absolute (unconditioned) **unity of the thinking subject**, the **second** the absolute **unity of the**

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<sup>311</sup> Ibid, page 347

<sup>312</sup> Ibid, page 360

**series of conditions of appearance, the third the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general.**

This shows Kant's recognition of a threefold system of 'classes' which includes the thinking subject, conditions of appearance of physical objects and the third 'absolute uniting' class of all objects of thought. This shows that his idea of unity lies within himself rather than in the phenomenal (physical) world. He continues to describe his classes further in the next passage:

The thinking subject is the object of **psychology**, the sum total of all appearances (the world) is the object of **cosmology**, and the thing that contains the supreme condition of the possibility of everything that can be thought (the being of all beings) is the object of **theology**. Thus pure reason provides the ideas for a transcendental doctrine of the soul (**psychologia rationalis**), a transcendental science of the world (**cosmologia rationalis**), and finally also a transcendental cognition of God (**theologia transcendentalis**).<sup>313</sup>

He puts these classes into their respective disciplines of psychology, cosmology and theology and introduces the concept of 'soul' to his system. As we have learnt from Plato, Aristotle and others, soul has feminine characteristics and connects other characters and ideas in relationship. For Kant this is his 'absolute' idea of unity. This idea is however transcendental, meaning that it remains in his 'noumena' and not related to physical aspect of reality. In other words, Kant does not include the phenomenal as part of unity. Physical things have a life of their own; they exist in their own right and exist whether we perceive them or not. When we experience a peaceful death of an individual, the phenomenal world continues without interruption. Even the dead person's body still exists intact until the decay process consumes it.

Unlike Descartes', Kant has not differentiated his soul into its upper and lower relationships and therefore only has eyes for the physical as it affects his Noumenal perception of it. In other words, he is more concerned with the idea behind objects rather than the object itself. He gives reality to the object through projection of the idea, which as we have seen from the previous study of the ancient's, may have no relationship to the object.


No **objective deduction** of these transcendental ideas is really possible, such as we could provide for the categories. For just because they are

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<sup>313</sup> Ibid, page 406

ideas, they have in fact no relation to any object that could be given congruent to them.<sup>314</sup>

As mentioned previously, the idea of an object can be somewhat different to the object itself. For example when the ancients viewed the planets, they projected inner characters onto them and gave them a life based on their perceived behaviour. Today we know more about the planets behaviour and have to some extent, withdrawn the projections. Projection forms the initial relationship and interest in an object and can keep that energetic system working until the interest evaporates OR, until the reality of the object is recognised and the idea resembles the object itself. Upon withdrawal of a projection, we learn about an object as it is and the idea changes as we learn more. This also includes other people and the withdrawal of projections of inner characters encourages the development of an aligned idea of the other person.



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The diagram above puts Kant's idea of soul into its four constituent functions and attempts to connect it to its physical orientation. We know that matter is made of complex arrangements of atoms and molecules. He is hesitant in the relational aspect of objects (possible) and regards the time an object exists as a unity. Naturally, an object has to exist in space and time otherwise it does not actually exist. The idea of the object however, is still there in memory and outside the influence of space and time.

But something that seems to be even further removed from objective reality than the idea is what I call the **ideal**, by which I understand the idea not merely **in concreto** but **in individuo**, i.e., as an individual thing which is determinable, or even determined, through the idea alone.

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<sup>314</sup> Ibid, page 406

<sup>315</sup> Ibid, page 413



Again, we have to be very cautious making any determinations about an object from the idea we project onto it. We can make the grossest errors during this natural but initial stage of getting to know an object. Knowledge of an object is furthered by observation and experimentation. For example, we perceive a white coffee mug with our eyes, then close our eyes, we can still see the mug as a specific idea that is connected to that particular mug. That particular mug also belongs to the idea of all mugs and we can change its colour, shape, size etc. The original mug, as physical object has not changed, but the idea of it has. This is the function of projection in that it gives the initial connection to an object. If we confuse the idea of it with the object, we can get into all kinds of confusing misinterpretations and not see the object as it is.

What is an ideal to us, was to **Plato** an **idea in the divine understanding**, an individual object in that understanding's pure intuition, the most perfect thing of each species of possible beings and the original ground of all its copies in appearance.<sup>316</sup>

In the above passage, Kant uses Plato to reinforce his concept of the object being merely an appearance of the idea, thus robbing the object of its own existence.

It makes a big difference whether something is given to my reason as **an object absolutely** or is given only as an **object in the idea**. In the first case my concepts go as far as determining the object; but in the second, there is really only a schema for which no object is given, not even hypothetically, but which serves only to represent other objects to us, in accordance with their systematic unity, by means of the relation to this idea, hence to represent these objects indirectly.<sup>317</sup>

Kant continues to describe the difference between the object and the idea of the object and rightly identifies the fact that the idea can exist without the object. He understood the reality and connection of idea and object but did not explore the idea to its natural conclusion. If he studied the Noumenal as an inner reality beyond object, he may have divined its meaning and purpose. In dreams, we recognise familiar objects, but it is the meaning of the object being conveyed, not the object itself. Every object has its own meaning in that the idea has a deeper and symbolic aspect to it. For example, a stone has hardness, shape, colour, crystalline structure, certain elements and so on, yet symbolically a stone can be at once worthless and precious, (diamond and coal) unwavering in its hardness, strong, difficult to budge, a unity in itself, incorruptible, has a

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<sup>316</sup> Ibid, page 551

<sup>317</sup> Ibid, page 605

special place in alchemy and so on. The symbolic language builds upon the physical nature of the object.

Finally and thirdly, (in regard to theology) we have to consider everything that might ever belong to the context of possible experience **as if** this experience constituted an absolute unity, but one dependent through and through, and always still conditioned within the world of sense, yet at the same time **as if** the sum total of all appearances (the world of sense itself) had a single supreme and all-sufficient ground outside its range, namely an independent, original, and creative reason, as it were, in relation to which we direct every empirical use of **our** reason in its greatest extension **as if** the objects themselves had arisen from that original image of all reason.<sup>318</sup>

This is the difficulty in studying Kant as he discusses whether the object or the idea of the object came first. He is of the opinion although hesitant with his use of the term 'as if', that the idea of the object existed before the object. At the limits of knowledge, objects attract projection and the unknown fills with an idea. In the ancient world, a planet seen in the night sky encouraged projection that related to the perceived behaviour of the planet and every other characteristic was an inner projection. Knowledge of the object diminishes the projection and transforms it into an idea closer in relationship to the object. In other words, the original projection of Saturn the God (central inner character) onto the planet transformed into what we now know as a gas giant with rings of dust and debris. In this case, the original projection was stripped away and recedes back into the unconscious. The idea of Saturn is still based on its behaviour, rings, colour and so on. His attributes have not changed, as well as his family relationships. To say that the planet arose from the myth is an error in judgement and lacks knowledge of and true relationship to the object as well as a relationship to the original idea projected onto the object. Saturn as object was around long before we had any idea of what it was. The idea of Saturn we inherited from our ancestors as a pattern of behaviour, which repeats itself in individuals throughout history.

Complete purposive unity is perfection (absolutely considered). If we do not find this in the essence of the things which constitute the whole object of experience, i.e., all our objectively valid cognition, hence in universal and necessary laws of nature, then how will we infer straight away from this to the idea of a highest and absolutely necessary perfection in an original being, which is the origin of all causality? The greatest systematic unity, consequently also purposive unity, is the school and even the ground of the possibility of the greatest use of

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<sup>318</sup> Ibid, page 607

human reason. Hence the idea of it is inseparably bound up with the essence of our reason.<sup>319</sup>

Finally, Kant attempts to bring his whole system into a perfect absolute unity and original being, which he regards as the origin of all causality. The use of the term 'perfect' seems too constricted to describe the workings of nature and the struggle for power that it entails. If a comet obliterates the earth, then it makes the perfection of God a little redundant, as there would be no one left to appreciate the meaning of such destruction. We say that nature is 'perfect' and balanced because it works. Perfection is usually associated with good and not the balanced,<sup>320</sup> beautiful, wondrous, yet horrific systems of nature. In addition, can a Perfect Being be responsible for creating imperfection? It is more reasonable to consider the Supreme Being, whoever or whatever that may be, in contrast to my personal idea of it, having complete unity in itself and all aspects of existence, both perfect and imperfect.

#### i. Hume D. (1711 - 1776)

Hume was a contemporary of Rousseau in later life and had a friendship with him that ended badly. As a down-to-earth man, Hume's view of the natural man was opposite to Rousseau's view. To Hume, everything including ideas came from sense perceptions leaving an impression on the mind.

All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two different kinds, which I shall call Impressions and Ideas. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter with the most force and violence, we may name impressions; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning.....<sup>321</sup>

Hume puts sensations with passions and emotions separate to ideas, which he regards as faint images related to thinking and reasoning. He therefore describes two realms that have differing energy levels of force. He regards the impressions having a close relationship to the body and the senses and are affected by external sense perceptions and internal passions or instincts and their associated emotions.

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<sup>319</sup> Ibid, page 618

<sup>320</sup> Nature is easily affected by environmental changes and adjusts to suit.

<sup>321</sup> HUME I, 'A Treatise of Human Nature' Books One, Two and Three; 2nd Edition; Oxford at the Clarendon Press; First Edition 1888, Oxford 1978, 2nd Edition 1978 - Book 1, Section 1, Of the Origin of Our Ideas, page 1

As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly explicable by human reason, and 'twill always be impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produc'd by the creative power of the mind, or are deriv'd from the author of our being.<sup>322</sup>

He regards sense perceptions of objects as the “ultimate cause” of ideas, which is a reasonable interpretation if we only regard ideas in their visual sense, rather than their meaning. He did have doubts about this interpretation as the above text shows, leaving the door open to the “creative power of the mind” and the “author of our being” as possible origins. To emphasise the role of sense perceptions and how they fit into a typical natural system, I posit the following example: Humans and animals alike share the sexual instinct and depend on the idea of a partner and union with that partner. This idea is accompanied by an urge to satisfy sexual union. The sense perception of a potential partner may spark the urge, but the urge has a life of its own and a cyclic frequency, much the same as the need for food. The instinct is to some extent blind as it can be relieved without its natural goal of union with a partner (object). This does not have any bearing on its meaning, as the instincts' purpose is union with the object and propagation of a uniting third. The idea of unity and union of opposites is still the reason behind the instinct and the object is a necessary component, but not the “ultimate cause”. The creative mind, as Hume mentions, is but a tool for the satisfaction of the instinct as the elaborate mating rituals of humans and animals testify.

We find by experience, that when an impression has been present with the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea; and this it may do after two different ways: either when its new appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, and in somewhat intermediate between an impression and an idea; or when it entirely loses its vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The faculty by which we repeat out impressions in the first manner, is called the MEMORY, and the other the IMAGINATION.<sup>323</sup>

In this passage, Hume continues his description of impressions and ideas but includes the relationship and gradation of vivacity between them. What starts as an impression with emotion from an internal or external perception becomes a memory after the perception. He explains how the memory moves from impression to idea with the loss of emotional intensity, which he terms the ‘perfect idea’.

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<sup>322</sup> Ibid, -Section V, Of the Impressions of the Senses and Memory, page 84

<sup>323</sup> Ibid, -Section III, Of Ideas of the Memory and Imagination, page 8

It is debatable whether a perfect idea exists without an emotion attached to it. The law of attraction and repulsion governs all ideas and emotions, and gives life to the ideas. For example, we can have the idea of a loving father, which would attract our interest and therefore feel a level of reverence, admiration and love. On the other hand, the idea of a monster repels us with a feeling of disdain and fear<sup>324</sup>.

In addition, a perfect idea without emotion is in fact indifference to the idea. In other words, the idea does not move us and there is no attractive or repulsive judgment to it. In this sense, indifference is located at the centre of attraction on one side and repulsion on the other. Indifference has much in common with time in that the line between past and future is but a transition between one and the other. It has no dimension and cannot be regarded other than a line of transition. It is where the past meets the future. The reason we feel the present is because we have memory of what just occurred and predictive anticipation of what is to come. It is the same with indifference, in that it is located between attraction, repulsion, and all the tones in between.

But tho' in this view of things we cannot refuse to condemn the materialists, who conjoin all thought with extension; yet a little reflection will show us equal reason for blaming their antagonists, who conjoin all thought with a simple and indivisible substance. The most vulgar philosophy in forms us, that no external object can make itself known to the mind immediately, and without the interposition of an image or perception.<sup>325</sup>

Hume in this instance sees both sides of a philosophical orientation and in some way the unity of opposites. Whether we see the mind as an adjunct to the body, or the body an adjunct to the mind, it is the same idea of unity from differing points of view.

Methinks I am like a man, who having struck on many shoals, and having narrowly escape'd ship-wreck in passing a small frith, has yet the temerity to put out to sea in the same leaky weather-beaten vessel, and even carries his ambition so far as to think of compassing the globe under these disadvantageous circumstances. My memory of past errors and perplexities, make me diffident to the future. The wretched condition, weakness and disorder of the faculties, I must employ in my enquiries, encrease my apprehensions. And the impossibility of or correcting these faculties, reduces me almost to despair, and makes me resolve to perish on the barren rock, on which I am at present, rather than venture myself upon that boundless ocean, which runs out into immensity. This

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<sup>324</sup> I am generalising here for I have no doubt that some people are attracted to the idea of evil and have positive feelings toward it.

<sup>325</sup> HUME I, A Treatise of Human Nature' Books One, Two and Three; 2nd Edition; -Section V, Of the Immateriality of the Soul, page 239

sudden view of my danger strikes me melancholy; and as 'tis usual for that passion, above all others, to indulge itself; I cannot forbear feeding my despair, with all those desponding reflection, which the present subject furnishes me with in such abundance. ....When I look abroad, I foresee on every side, dispute, contradiction, anger, calumny and detraction. When I turn my eye inward, I find nothing but doubt and ignorance.<sup>326</sup>

This very poignant passage shows how Hume came to a stage in his life where the physical world had lost its attraction and he became aware that his aging body and mind (vessel) could not embark on a journey over the ocean (unconscious). Looking inward, he sees doubt and ignorance, but as he mentions in the following passage, does recognise an inner woman (truth).

For with what confidence can I venture upon such bold enterprizes, when beside those numberless infirmities peculiar to myself, I find so many which are common to human nature? Can I be sure, that in leaving all establish'd opinions I am following truth, and by what criterion shall I distinguish her, even if fortune shou'd at last guide me on her footsteps?<sup>327</sup>

Allowing an inner woman to lead us is by no means an easy task for an older man preoccupied with reason. Turning away from the world as Rousseau did is not for everyone and many perish on the ocean of the unconscious. Hume does, however sense that his unity depends on the journey into himself as he describes in the following passage and his idea of that unity in waiting.

'Tis evident here are four affections, plac'd, as it were, in a square or regular connexion with, and distance from each other. The passions of pride and humility, as well as those of love and hatred, are connected together by the identity of their object, which to the first set of passions is self, to the second some other person. These two lines of communication or connexion form two opposite sides of the square. Again pride and love are agreeable passions; hatred and humility uneasy. This similitude of sensation betwixt pride and love, and that betwixt humility and hatred form a new connexion, and may be consider'd as the other two sides of the square. Upon the whole, pride is connected with humility, love with hatred, by their objects and ideas: Pride with love, humility with hatred, by their sensations or impressions.<sup>328</sup>

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<sup>326</sup> Ibid, Section VII, Conclusion of this Book (Book 1), page 265

<sup>327</sup> Ibid, page 263

<sup>328</sup> Ibid, Book II, Part II, Objects and Causes of Love and Hatred, page 333

He mentions a squared Mandala shape with the four corners having paired opposites of the passions (emotions): pride/humility and love/hate and gives them a value judgement of agreeability (attraction) and uneasiness (repulsion). He cross-connects the four into a relational system of opposites and adjacent passions. In addition, he brings the whole system under the umbrella of sensation, in other words, the perception of these passions. This shows Hume's orientation is towards the physical, not the inner realm of ideas of Rousseau. He does however perceive what comes from the inner realm as it affects his body and therefore is perceptible to his mind. This is emphasised in the next passage where Hume describes what happens when the 'hold' of external objects is loosened.

Those, who take a pleasure in declaiming against human nature, have observ'd, that man is altogether insufficient to support himself; and that when you loosen all the holds, which he has of external objects, he immediately drops down into the deepest melancholy and despair. From this, say they, proceeds that continual search after amusement in gaming, in hunting, in business; by which we endeavour to forget ourselves, and excite our spirits from the languid state, into which they fall, when not sustain'd by some brisk and lively emotion..... On the appearance of such an object it awakes, as it were from a dream: And the whole man acquires a vigour, which he cannot command in his solitary and calm moments.<sup>329</sup>

Hume shows his typology here with his acknowledgement of the melancholy and despair that overcomes him in his solitary and calm moments. Obviously, not everyone feels these emotions when looking inside. Creative types are always inspired and energised by a new idea they wish to express and in this instance, the idea needs expression and shaping as an object, rather than what Hume regards as the object giving the vigour (energy) or lively emotion.

He does, however give us an indirect hint of how his personality perceives the physical as well as the psychic by the way energy flows from inside to outside. He does this by calling activities such as gaming, hunting and business as amusements and how they 'excite our spirits'. Although he perceives the flow of energy, he does not see the ideas behind the activities that free the energy and bring it into the physical world. I do not wish to go into the symbolic qualities of these activities in depth, other than to comment on the competitive aspect of the idea and object. For example, gaming is driven by the urge to overcome an obstacle and win the object, hunting the overcoming of the animal within and killing its representation, and business the negotiating art to obtain

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<sup>329</sup> Ibid, Section IV, Of the Love of Relations, page 352

the object. This competitive or combative aspect of his idea of unity and preference for one side is empathised in the following:

Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and to assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates.<sup>330</sup>

## j. Schopenhauer. A (1788 - 1860)

Schopenhauer's pessimistic temperament permeates throughout his work and life and is emphasised in the attitude he had to his idea of unity. He resigned himself to the fact that a greater will was in control of his life, rather than his own personal will. This is emphasised in his attitude to dreams, which he regards as 'absurd' presumably due their lack of obvious logic and purpose.

For as the world is in one aspect entirely *idea*, so in another it is entirely *will*. However, a reality which is neither of these two, but an object in itself (into which Kant's thing-in-itself has unfortunately degenerated in the course of his work), is the absurd product of a dream, and its credence in philosophy is a treacherous will-o'-wisp.<sup>331</sup>

He sees the greater will in a negative light due to his unwillingness to accept his own human nature as it is, rather than how he feels it could be. He does however, acknowledge the reality of dream in the next passage and that the physical and psychic realms share imagery but relates the imagery to the intellect. In other words, Schopenhauer tries to see the unity of inner and outer without sufficiently differentiating their characteristics.

For only after men had tried their hand for thousands of years at a mere philosophy of the object did they discover that, among the many things that make the world so puzzling and give us pause for thought, is first and foremost that, however immeasurable and massive this world may be, its existence hangs nonetheless by a single thread: that is, the actual consciousness in which it exists. The world's existence is irrevocably subject to this condition, and this brands it, in spite of all empirical reality, with the stamp of ideality, and therefore of mere phenomenal appearance. As a result, the world must be recognised, at least from this aspect, as akin to dreaming, and indeed as belonging to the same category. For the function of the brain which, during sleep, conjures up a completely objective, perceptible, and even palpable world, must have

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<sup>330</sup> Ibid, Part III, Section III, Of the Influencing Motives of the Will, page 413

<sup>331</sup> SCHOPENHAUER A, The World as Will and Idea, , Edited by David Berman, Translated by Jill Berman, Everyman 1997, The World as Idea -First Aspect, page 5



just as large a share in the presentation of the objective world of our waking hours. For both worlds, although different in their matter, are nonetheless made from the same mould. This mould is the intellect, the function of the brain.<sup>332</sup>

This leads to a cross-contamination and raises a doubt about the reality of either. Schopenhauer projected idealism onto the physical realm, and attempted to look at the origin of the projection. He concludes that both the physical and psychic realms come from the same 'mould' which he regards as the intellect. This shows his ability to see the difference between inner and outer, but not how they are related. It also demonstrates Schopenhauer's approach to understanding the opposites and identifies the physical as purely phenomenal with the 'stamp of ideality'.

Only consciousness is immediately given; therefore the basis of philosophy is limited to facts of consciousness, i.e., it is essentially idealistic.<sup>333</sup>

This is an attempt to connect the opposites and relate them. Schopenhauer recognises the problem is one of understanding the ideal and sees how dream images are borrowed from the physical world, thus connecting them in that way. Therefore, he has the same view as Kant and regards physical reality as a phenomenon of conscious cognition. He regarded matter as dead and lifeless and not having the 'will' of living creatures.

Although materialism imagines that it is postulating nothing more than this matter- in the form, for instance, of atoms - it is nevertheless unconsciously adding to it only the subject, but also space, time, and causality, which depend upon special properties of the subject..... The world as idea, the objective world, has thus, as it were, two poles: the knowing subject, simply without the forms of its knowledge, and then crude matter without form and quality. Both are completely unknowable: the subject because it is the knower, matter because without form and quality it cannot be perceived. Yet both are fundamental conditions of all empirical perception. Thus the knowing subject, merely as such, which is a presupposition of all experience, stands opposite, as its pure counterpart, to the crude, formless, and utterly dead (i.e., will-less) matter, which, though not given in any, is presupposed in every experience. ....

The fundamental error of all systems is the failure to recognise this truth, the truth that intellect and matter are correlatives, i.e., that the one exists only for the other, both stand and fall together, the one is only the

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<sup>332</sup> Ibid, Supplement to Book One, The Standpoint of Idealism, page 12

<sup>333</sup> Ibid, page 13.

reflexion of the other, and indeed, they are really one and the same thing regarded from two opposite points of view; and this one thing, I am here anticipating, is the manifestation of the will, or the thing-in-itself.<sup>334</sup>

Schopenhauer explains how intellect and matter are related and opposite but does not recognise their equality. He sees matter as an extension, reflection and indispensable to intellect, but of lower rank and only exists for the other. The opposites of matter and intellect in Schopenhauer's understanding are indeed indispensable to each other and unified in a system of checks and balances, which holds the system together. His idea of one side serving the other can only be maintained for short periods, as the system can only be sustained with equality. The servant always has feelings of rebellion and oppression and seeks equality with the master. Schopenhauer confuses matter with the idea of matter as part of our perceptive function and although drawn from the object, can exist independently. Matter exists of its own accord and does not cease to exist if we do not perceive it.

Schopenhauer describes the opposites as the same thing from different viewpoints united by the Will and recognises the third aspect of opposites united. He gives it a mysterious unknown quality removed from perception and understanding. There is no feeling attached to the idea which could give it a life and humanity. He perceives the relationship in image alone and not as a living vibrant system. This is the difference between perceiving unity passively and taking part in it actively. Schopenhauer continues with his idea of will and calls it a force that affects humans, animals, plants and what he previously referred to as "dead matter". Further, he includes the forces that govern crystal, metal, magnetism and gravitation, and attempts to bring matter and Will into a unified whole. On one hand he regards matter as dead, and the other, recognises the forces that influence matter, which are the same forces that influence Will as he states in the next passage:

This will of which we are speaking he will recognise as the inmost nature not only in those phenomenon which are closely similar to his own, in men and animals, but further reflection will lead him also to recognise the force which stirs and vegetates in the plant, and indeed the force by which the crystal is formed, that by which the magnet turns to the North Pole, the force whose shock he experiences from the contact between different metals, the force which appears in the elective affinities of matter as repulsion and attraction, separation and combination, and, lastly, even gravitation, which pulls so powerfully through all matter, draws the stone to the earth and the earth to the sun -all these he will recognise as different only in their phenomenal existence, but in their inner nature as identical, as what is directly known to him so intimately

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<sup>334</sup> Ibid, pages 20 and 21

and so much better than anything else, and which, in its most distinct manifestation, is called *will*.<sup>335</sup>

This is where Schopenhauer sets himself apart as he recognises the fundamental forces of nature pertaining to this Will and how it stirs, affects, shocks, and co-ordinates living as well as so-called 'dead' matter. All living things are made of the same material (elements) as 'dead' things and are fully categorised into their various properties and atomic structures. Schopenhauer's recognition of electromagnetic forces of attraction and repulsion, separation and combination and gravitation, all come from his concept and relationship to the overarching unity Schopenhauer calls Will.

The concept *will*, on the other hand, is of all possible concepts the only one which has its source *not* in the phenomenal, *not* in the mere perceptive ideation, but comes from within, and arises in the most immediate consciousness of each of us. ....The *will* as a thing in itself is totally different from its phenomenon, and entirely free from all the forms of the phenomenal. Since the will enters into these forms only at the very moment when it manifests itself, they have to do only with its *objectivity*, and are alien to the will itself. Even the most universal form of all idea, that of being object for a subject, is irrelevant to it; still less the forms which are subordinate to this and which collectively have their common expression in the principal of sufficient reason.<sup>336</sup>

Schopenhauer cleverly distinguishes between Will and the concept of 'Will', which comes into consciousness from inside. He has therefore, differentiated the psychic from physical connecting them to Will. We cannot know the Will due to its all-encompassing nature. The concept or idea of Will is more personal and accessible to the individual if the necessary inner work carried out. This is why many groups have different ideas of God. It is a personal interpretation based on temperament, experience, understanding and relationship to other individuals.

Hence the strange fact that everyone regards himself as *a priori* perfectly free, even in his individual actions, and believes that at any moment he could embark upon a different path in life, which mean his becoming a different person. But a *posteriori*, through experience, he finds to his astonishment that he is not free, but subject to necessity; that in spite of all his resolutions and reflections of his life to the end of it, he must continue to play the very role which he himself condemns, and, as it were, play to the end the part he has undertaken.<sup>337</sup>

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<sup>335</sup> Ibid, Book Two, First Aspect, page 42

<sup>336</sup> Ibid, page 44

<sup>337</sup> Ibid, page 46

Schopenhauer continues his description of Will and its influence on the individual's life path. He questions an individual's freedom and in his experience, the Will determines a person's fate. In other words, Schopenhauer considers the Will a determining factor in a person's life and is directed by this Will, which is innate rather than selected by the individual. This idea is similar to the 'individuation' that the ancient Egyptian God Khepri represented and used by the scholastic philosophers in the 13<sup>th</sup> century and Carl Jung in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It also has similarities to the Chinese idea of Toa (path). The evidence discovered through comparative analysis in modern psychology shows that this path is indeed a fact and deviation from one's path leads to illness.

On the other hand, if we have thoroughly grasped the philosophical insight that a force of nature is a definite grade of what we, too, recognise as our own inmost nature, and that this will, in itself and distinct from its phenomenon and their forms, lies outside time and space, and hence that plurality (which is conditioned by time and space) is a property not of the will, nor directly of the grade of its objectification, i.e., the Idea, but only of the phenomena of the Idea; and if we remember that the law of causality is meaningful only in relation to time and space, in that there it determines the position of the teeming phenomena of the different ideas in which the will reveals itself, governing the order in which they are to become manifest; if, I say, with this insight the deeper meaning of Kant's great doctrine has dawned on us - the doctrine that time, space, and causality do not belong to the thing-in-itself, but merely to the phenomenon.....<sup>338</sup>

This passage shows Schopenhauer's recognition of the relation between inner and outer realms and that the inner Will lies outside time and space. Indeed, the unconscious and its products such as dreams have their own processes and laws. They do not comply with physical laws of matter in space and time. I must however put a caveat on this statement as the research into sub atomic particles indicates that matter itself at this scale, does not comply with known physical laws.

The will as the thing in itself, constitutes the inner, true, and indestructible nature of man; yet in itself it is unconscious.<sup>339</sup>

Schopenhauer's lack of personal relation to the 'will' by using the term 'it' is reflected in his poor relation to other people, especially women, and an inability to see the 'will' as an inner character with attributes. He perceives the force associated with Will and all its manifestations, but not the nature

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<sup>338</sup> Ibid, page 65

<sup>339</sup> Ibid, Supplement to Book Two, On the Primacy of the Will in Self Consciousness, page 87

of his particular idea of Will. I have no doubt that Schopenhauer perceived his idea of God in all his glory through his intuitions, but then proceeded to abstract his (its) metaphysical essence 'thing-in-itself' and draw universal conclusions from this abstraction. As previously mentioned, it is the difference between what Kant and Schopenhauer call the 'thing-in-itself' and the idea of it. The 'thing-in-itself' is universal, but our perception, experience and dialogue with it is personal. God is universal, the idea of God is personal and relates to the individual directly from within.

This is called 'being master of oneself'. Clearly the master here is the will, the servant the intellect, for in the last instance the will always keeps the upper hand, and therefore constitutes the true core, the inner being, of man.<sup>340</sup>

Again, he emphasises the central and master position of Will and delegates the intellect to the servant of that Will. This shows the authority his idea of Will had on him was like a father to a son, and excludes the feminine principle. His personal relationship to his mother and father were determining factors to this orientation. His father died when Schopenhauer was a teenager and he did not get on well with his mother. These initial relationships often set the tone of all future relationships and the direction of development. Schopenhauer carried this pattern into life, and expressed it in his attitude to women, siding with all the attributes represented by the character of father.

As Schopenhauer mentions, individuation is something we often fight against because we live in a scientific and technological age with waning spiritual belief systems<sup>341</sup>.

It has often been remarked that genius and madness have an aspect in common, and even converge; and indeed poetical inspiration has been called a kind of madness: *amabilis insania*, Horace calls it (*Odes*. III. 4). Plato expresses it in the myth of the dark cave (*Rep.* 7), when he says: 'those who, outside the cave, have seen the true sunlight and the things that have true being (Ideas), cannot afterwards see properly in the cave, because their eyes have grown unaccustomed to the darkness; they can no longer recognise the shadows, and are jeered at for their mistakes by those who have never left the cave and its shadows.'<sup>342</sup>

The above metaphoric description of the unconscious shows Schopenhauer's identification with consciousness (sunlight) through the

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<sup>340</sup> Ibid, page 92

<sup>341</sup> I feel that humanity is in a transition period and that we are on the verge of a new way of looking at reality, which includes inner and outer realms in relationship.

<sup>342</sup> SCHOPENHAUER A, *The World as Will and Idea*, Edited by David Berman, Translated by Jill Berman, Everyman 1997, *The World as Idea*, page 114

teachings of Plato. The unconscious (dark cave) for him is where madness lurks and indeed if one does not have a strong connection to the physical world, the chaos and loss of orientation in the unconscious can lead to madness as we saw with Rousseau. It never dawned on Schopenhauer to strive for the footings of a normal life, including wife and family, support them and having to bite one's tongue to adapt and develop some feeling. This would have given him a personal flame (light) to see within the cave and meet the characters that revolve around the Will, and stand behind every instinct and emotion.

Dogmas change and our knowledge is deceptive; but nature never errs; she moves confidently, and she never conceals what she is doing. Everything is complete and fulfilled in nature, and nature is complete and fulfilled in everything. She has her centre in every animal. With confidence the animal has found its path into life, just as with confidence it will find its way out; in the meantime it lives without fear of annihilation, and without cares, supported by the consciousness that it is nature herself, and is imperishable as she is.<sup>343</sup>

He does however, perceive an abstracted and projected version of an inner character in physical nature and recognised her femininity as an imperishable soul, which all creatures have in common. Animals cannot deviate from their path in life due to their undeveloped awareness and personal will, and can only abide by the greater Will of their instinctual foundation.

All this means, to be sure, that life can be regarded as a dream and death as the awakening from it: but it must be remembered that the personality, the individual, belongs to the dreaming and not the awakened consciousness, which is why death appears to the individual as annihilation. In any event, death is not, from this point of view, to be considered a transition to a state completely new and foreign to us, but rather a return to one originally our own from which life had been only a brief absence.<sup>344</sup>

This is an example of Schopenhauer's view that knowledge of the unconscious is gained through projection onto physical objects but he could not perceive the characters and functions of it directly. He could only see its forms and phenomena in the physical world. The differentiation of physical and psychic is necessary to see either side as they are. In other words, the physical has its own existence and laws, as does the inner realm of the psyche. The relationship between the two can only have integrity if either side is recognised as such without the cross-contamination of projection.

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<sup>343</sup> Ibid, page 183

<sup>344</sup> Ibid, On the Indestructibility of our Essential Being by Death, '6', page 70

An odd and unworthy definition of philosophy, which however even Kant gives, is that it is a science composed only of concepts. For the entire property of a concept consists of nothing more than what has been begged and borrowed from perceptual knowledge, which is the true and inexhaustible source of all insight. So that a true philosophy cannot be spun out of mere abstract concepts, but has to be founded on observation and experience, inner and outer.<sup>345</sup>

Schopenhauer views concepts as 'begged and borrowed' from the perceptual (physical world), but does not realise that ideas are formulated not through logical processes, but pop into one's awareness spontaneously. It is not clear if Schopenhauer means 'inner' as dreams, fantasies, characters, etc., or that he means the physical expression of emotion, instincts etc., which are the expressions of inner characters. The body senses hunger and emptiness accompanied by pain, but the idea of hunger includes its solution. What is a biological function also includes innate and learned ideas of how to satisfy the function. For example, we know that we can get food from the supermarket. Early humans knew that they had to go out and hunt, forage for plants and seeds, which as I noted in the previous study of Ancient Egypt, was the beginning of culture.

Ideas, dreams, fantasies etc., use imagery from the physical world woven into symbolic expression. The imagery may be familiar but the symbolic interpretation is hard to grasp, as it is deeper than our understanding. For example, observing young children learning to talk shows the frustration they have in expressing what already exists in their mind. We use language to communicate clearly, for a child it is an emotion or satisfaction of an instinct such as hunger expressed through facial changes, behaviour etc. The idea already exists, but its expression varies depending on the individual. Schopenhauer recognises this function in the following passage.

One might almost believe that half our thinking takes place unconsciously. Usually we arrive at a conclusion without having clearly thought about the premises which lead to it. This is already evident from the fact that sometimes an occurrence whose consequences we can in no way foresee, still less clearly estimate its possible influence on our own affairs, will nonetheless exercise an unmistakable influence on our whole mood and will change it from cheerful to sad or from sad to cheerful: this can only be the result of unconscious rumination. It is even more obvious in the following: I have familiarized myself with the factual data of a theoretical or practical problem; I do not think about it again, yet often a few days later the answer to the problem will come into my mind entirely of its own accord; the operation which has produced it,

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<sup>345</sup> Ibid, On Philosophy and the Intellect, '5', page 118

however, remains as much a mystery to me as that of an adding-machine: what has occurred is, again, unconscious rumination. -One might almost venture the physiological hypothesis that conscious thinking takes place on the surface of the brain, unconscious thinking inside it.<sup>346</sup>

This text reveals an uncanny awareness of how consciousness has no input into processing ideas. Indeed, this is basis of creativity and as he mentions, is a mystery of the highest order. The ancients recognised the process as the movement of inner characters they called Gods, at work processing information and providing it when needed. Careful observation of these inner characters shows that the ancient Gods have not disappeared, but only changed their names. When we get cranky and want to fight, an angry inner character like Mars (God of war) is activated. When a man has tender feelings of love and affection, an inner woman like Venus (Goddess of love) grips us, and so on. These days, we project these characters onto movie super heroes, romantic lovers and beautiful seductive women.

We know that *multiplicity* in general is necessarily conditioned by space and time, and is only thinkable in them. In this respect they are called the *principium individuationis*. But we have found that space and time are forms of the principle of sufficient reason. In this principle all our knowledge *a priori* is expressed, but, as we showed above, this *a priori* knowledge, as such, only applies to the knowableness of things, not to the things themselves, *i.e.*, it is only our form of knowledge, it is not a property of the thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself is, as such, free from all forms of knowledge, even the most universal, that of being an object for the subject. In other words, the thing-in-itself is something altogether different from the idea. If, now, this thing-in-itself is *the will*, as I believe I have fully and convincingly proved it to be, then, regarded as such and apart from its manifestation, it lies outside time and space, and therefore knows no multiplicity, and is consequently *one*.<sup>347</sup>

In this passage, Schopenhauer refers once again to the single Will but does not see the multiplicity within the unconscious. As history shows, every idea of God (will) has its helpers, messengers and detractors. Animism had its totems and animals, the ancients had multiple Gods in a family, Judaism its prophets and angels, Christianity the trinity/satan and so on. These are all expressions of Will as an idea. What actually creates the ideas and what he calls the 'thing-in-itself' remains unknown at this stage in our evolution. It permeates all inner and outer realms; from the

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<sup>346</sup> Ibid, page 123

<sup>347</sup> SCHOPENHAUER Arthur, *The World as Will and Idea*, , Edited by David Berman, Translated by Jill Berman, Everyman 1997, Book Two, page 59



highest functioning of reason and intuition, to the structure of the atom and the forces holding the physical and psychic in balance.

Schopenhauer continues his discussion of the unity of the 'thing-in-itself' and how we can see its phenomena in every aspect of our physical existence.

It is only the knowledge of the unity of will as thing-in-itself, in the endless diversity and multiplicity of the phenomena, that can afford us the true explanation of that wonderful, unmistakable analogy of all the productions of nature, that family likeness on account of which we may regard them as variations on the same ungiven theme.<sup>348</sup>

The work of Schopenhauer is indeed monumental and anchored in the perceptive functions. He no doubt saw the unconscious in projected form and makes non-personal, abstract concepts from his observations. He assigns very few qualities to his Will. This lack of the personal connection was reflected his life and his attitude towards women. As a consequence, he had no eyes for the thing-in-itself and its inner manifestations of fantasy, dreams, etc. He did however, make use of the ideational function, presumably through his intuition to form his conceptual system of thought. His personal unity and opposite would therefore be feminine, which he rejected.

Life presented Schopenhauer opportunities to integrate the rejected feminine in the form of an illegitimate child. If he had accepted the child and the attached female relationship, he could have developed that new aspect of himself that the child represented. In spite of himself, the unconscious later forced him to support a woman he threw down the stairs because she annoyed him. It is the personal woman and acceptance of the biological responsibility that Schopenhauer lacked. His influence however, endures to this day.

#### k. Hegel G.W.F. (1770 - 1831)

Unlike Schopenhauer, Hegel had a relatively normal life with an academic career, wife and children. He goes further than Schopenhauer in his recognition of human nature and the opposites of subject and the 'other' as its reflection, which he regards as negative.

Further the living Substance is being which is in truth *Subject*, or, what is the same, is in truth actual only in so far as it is the movement of positing itself, or is the mediation of its self-othering with itself. This Substance is, as Subject, pure, *simple negativity*, and is for this very reason the

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<sup>348</sup> Ibid, page 81

bifurcation of the simple; it is the doubling which sets up opposition, and then again the negation of this indifferent diversity and of its antithesis [the immediate simplicity]. Only this self-restoring sameness, or this reflection in otherness within itself- not an *original* or *immediate* unity as such- is the True. It is the process of its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal, having its end also as its beginning; and only by being worked out to its end, is it actual.<sup>349</sup>

Hegel also recognises the circular closed system of becoming with the goal and necessity to 'work' it out to its end, and realise its unity. The image that Hegel describes is similar to the Uroboros<sup>350</sup> (circular snake eating its own tail) as a symbol of unity. He also recognises that relationship holds the circle together and describes some of the characters included in the circle.

The activity of dissolution is the power and work of the Understanding, the most astonishing and mightiest of powers, or rather the absolute power. The circle that remains self-enclosed and, like substance, holds its moments together, is an immediate relationship, one therefore which has nothing astonishing about it. But that an accident as such, detached from what circumscribes it, what is bound and is actual only in its context with others, should attain an existence of its own and a separate freedom- this is the tremendous power of the negative; it is the energy of thought, of the pure 'I'. Death, if that is what we want to call this non-actuality, is of all things the most dreadful, and to hold fast what is dead requires the greatest strength. Lacking strength, Beauty hates the Understanding for asking of her what it cannot do. But the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself.....Spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and tarrying with it. This tarrying is the magical power that converts it into being.<sup>351</sup>

The characters he includes are the 'negative', which I would equate to our animal or instinctive foundation, an emotional female character, which he calls 'beauty' and finally an incorruptible spirit that studies the negative (looking in the face) and through sacrifice (dismemberment), converts it into being. In one passage, Hegel explains the psychological functioning and understanding of human nature and its unity. He begins with the 'I', which is our personal awareness, our life in the world and in psychological terms, our ego. He identifies its shadow, which he calls

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<sup>349</sup> HEGEL G W F, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 1977 Oxford University Press, Translated by A. V. Miller, Preface, page 10

<sup>350</sup> The symbol of the Ouroboros originated in Ancient Egypt and later adopted by the Gnostic, Hermetic and Alchemical traditions as a symbol of wholeness or unity.

<sup>351</sup> HEGEL G W F, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 1977 Oxford University Press, Translated by A. V. Miller., page 18

negative and indeed, instinctive behaviour is to some extent, negative to our ego and culture.

Hegel describes the female as the emotional (hates the understanding) and aesthetic (beauty) function that cannot do what the understanding requests. For Hegel, his feeling represented by his inner woman is limited to the emotional, romantic and aesthetic sense. Later, it developed a moral quality that formed a bridge or relationship to the spirit, which in this instance can be recognised as eternal. Hegel's idea of spirit could be transformed but not annihilated and had characteristics existing outside of space and time. Hegel's spirit comes into its own (resurrected) after dismemberment, which is akin to the ancient myths of Osiris and Dionysus, the Alchemical transformation, and related to dissolution and resurrection in general. Finally, he hints at what he calls 'being', which is reached by a magical power of 'facing' and 'tarrying' with the negative or instinctive aspect of himself.

But in view of the fact that such thinking has a content, whether of picture-thoughts or abstract thoughts or a mixture of both, argumentation has another side which makes comprehension difficult for it. The remarkable nature of this other side is closely linked with the above-mentioned essence of the Idea, or rather it expresses the Idea in the way that it appears as the movement which is thinking apprehension.<sup>352</sup>

He describes the 'other side' and its 'contents', in the form of picture or abstract thoughts, which indeed is how the unconscious gives us information. In other words, the images and ideas presented to our awareness are a milder version of night-time dreams. Thoughts, when perceived without direction, can be as obscure and symbolic as dreams. Ideas, on the other hand, are generally chains of thoughts that have relational connections and help our understanding.

It is a natural assumption that in philosophy, before we start to deal with its proper subject-matter, viz. The actual cognition of what truly is, one must first of all come to an understanding about cognition, which is regarded either as the instrument to get hold of the Absolute, or as the medium through which one discovers it.<sup>353</sup>

Hegel points to a crucial idea concerning cognition as the essence, and basis of reality. In other words, reality is what we can perceive but is not limited to the physical. We can see the physical with our senses and make conclusions about how the physical works. Similarly, cognition also includes what we can see with our mind or inner eye. For example, if we have a dream, it is a cognitive fact that we perceive certain images and

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<sup>352</sup> Ibid, page 36

<sup>353</sup> Ibid, Introduction, page 46

felt certain emotions. Similarly, thoughts, fantasies, ideas etc., work in the same way. We cannot deny having such 'contents', as Hegel calls them. It is unfortunate that no one else can see these contents as they present themselves to the subject alone<sup>354</sup>. They can however, be perceived by others if the individual (subject) expresses them in writing, pictorial form or behaviour. This is the biggest obstacle some schools of psychology have in the way they interpret facts. The perception of unconscious contents in the individual is real, as we have learned from Kant.

To complete our insight into the notion of this movement it may further be noticed that the differences themselves are exhibited in a twofold difference: once as a difference of content, one extreme being the force reflected into itself, but the other the medium of the 'matters'; and again as difference of *form*, since one solicits and the other is solicited, the former being active and the other passive. According to the difference of content they are distinguished [merely] in principle, or *for us*; but according to the difference of form they are independent and in their relation keep themselves separate and opposed to one another.<sup>355</sup>

Hegel expands his recognition of the opposites and describes their differences in form. These include: force/medium, solicits/is solicited, active/passive, and each side is independent, separate and opposed to the other. We can interpret these opposites as masculine (force, solicits, active) and feminine (medium, is solicited, passive). He recognises the true nature of the human condition but the crucial aspect of the opposites is their relationship. This relationship offers the third alternative that unites them in an energetic system.

Examples surround us on all sides. In nature, the waterfall has upper and lower parts united by the water (energy) from high to low. The tree is the union of growth into the sky and into the earth. Fire and water united through the vessel. The ocean united with the earth at the shore. The earth unites the sun and moon, and so on. Examples of this system in humans are also numerous. Thinking and feeling are united by either intuition or the senses. In the Christian tradition, the Holy Spirit unites the father and the son, which was in some instances regarded as feminine. In alchemy, the symbolic aspect of Sun (consciousness) and Moon (unconscious) by the vessel, and so on. Hegel continues his discussion of the opposites and the 'middle term' as follows:

This true essence of Things has now the character of not being immediately for consciousness; on the contrary, consciousness has a

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<sup>354</sup> This is true of most unconscious products, although it is possible to share synchronistic experiences, which are a relational expression between unconscious forces and matter.

<sup>355</sup> HEGEL G W F, *Phenomenology of Spirit, III Force and the Understanding: Appearance and the Supersensible World*, Oxford University Press, 1977, page 85

mediated relation to the inner being and, as the Understanding, *looks through this mediating play of Forces into the true background of Things*. The middle term, which unites the two extremes, the Understanding and the inner world.....<sup>356</sup>

He describes in this passage consciousness, or the one that perceives, united with the inner 'being' by the understanding. This shows how the understanding is a crucial aspect of the union of conscious and unconscious realms. You cannot understand human nature unless you are aware of your own human nature and all that it entails.

The inner world for consciousness, still a pure beyond, because consciousness does not as yet find itself in it. It is empty, for it is merely the nothingness of appearance, and positively the simple or unitary universal. This mode of the inner being [of Things] finds ready acceptance by those who say that the inner being of Things is unknowable; but another reason for this would have to be given. Certainly, we have no knowledge of this inner world as it is here in its immediacy; but not because Reason is too short-sighted or is limited, or however else one likes to call it- on this point, we know nothing as yet because we have not yet gone deep enough- but because of the simple nature of the matter in hand, that is to say, because in the void nothing is known, or, expressed from the other side, just because this inner world is determined as the beyond of consciousness..... Or in order that there may yet be something in the void- which, though it first came about as devoid of objective things must, however, as empty in itself, be taken as also void of all spiritual relationships and distinctions of consciousness qua consciousness- in order, then, that in this complete void, which is even called the holy of holies, there may yet be something, we must fill it up with reveries, appearances, produced by consciousness itself..... The inner world, or supersensible beyond, has, however, come into being: it comes from the world of appearances which has mediated it; in other words, appearance is its essence and, in fact, its filling.<sup>357</sup>

Hegel makes a crucial error in his exploration of what he calls the 'supersensible' (unconscious) world and believes it comes from consciousness. This is the same view Freud had, as we shall see later in the study. It is an understandable mistake, because the unconscious uses images borrowed from the physical world and uses these images in extraordinary ways. In dreams, we perceive images and emotions poetically shaped in a way that often leaves us perplexed. Although the unconscious borrows images from the sensible world, it does so in order to reflect that world. The question Hegel neglected to ask is: what or who co-ordinates these images into a story or pictorial arrangement?

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<sup>356</sup> Ibid, page 86

<sup>357</sup> Ibid, page 88

Thus the supersensible world, which is the inverted world, has at the same time overarched the other world and has it within it; it is *for itself* the inverted world, i.e. the inversion of itself; it is itself and its opposite in one unity. Only thus is its difference as inner difference, or difference *in its own self*, or difference as an *infinity*.<sup>358</sup>

This passage is important because Hegel recognises the unconscious surrounding us on all sides and is eternal (infinity). The darkness before life and the darkness after death is the same darkness. The difference is we have the possibility of becoming aware of this fact. Hegel also sees the unity in the system of opposites as follows:

It is true that consciousness of an 'other', of an object in general, is itself necessarily self-consciousness, a reflectedness-into-self, consciousness of itself in its otherness.<sup>359</sup>

But in point of fact self-consciousness is the reflection out of the being of the world of sense and perception, and is essentially the return from *otherness*..... With that first moment, self *consciousness* is in the form of consciousness, and the whole expanse of the sensual world is preserved for it, but at the same time only as connected with the second moment, the unity of self-consciousness with itself; and hence the sensuous world is for it an enduring existence which, however, is only *appearance*, or a difference which, *in itself*, is no difference. The antithesis of its appearance and its truth has, however, for its essence only the truth, viz. The unity of self-consciousness with itself; this unity must become essential to self-consciousness, i.e. self-consciousness is *Desire* in general.<sup>360</sup>

He mentions at the end of this passage that self-consciousness is 'Desire'. In other words, he is aware of the emotional aspect of the 'supersensible' world (unconscious) and its instinctual foundation. It is unclear what Hegel means by desire and what the object of this desire is. We can only speculate on this idea but as experience shows, a sexual dream is symbolically the union of opposites. In other words, it is the union of a masculine consciousness with a feminine unconscious, symbolised by sexual desire and union.

For since the *essence* of the individual shape- universal Life- and what exists for itself is in itself simple substance, when this substance places the *other* within itself it supersedes this its *simplicity* or its essence, i.e. it divides it, and this dividedness of the differenceless fluid medium is just

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<sup>358</sup> Ibid, page 99

<sup>359</sup> Ibid, page 102

<sup>360</sup> HEGEL G W F, Phenomenology of Spirit, B. Self Consciousness; IV. The Truth of Self-Certainty, Oxford University Press, 1977, page 105

what establishes individuality. ....Since we started from the first immediate unity and returned through the moments of formation and of process to the unity of both these moments, and thus back again to the original simple substance, this reflected unity is different from the first.<sup>361</sup>

Hegel describes the original unity and becoming aware as an individual and returning to the original unity. We can equate this as a life's journey, as we are born and our unity found in the immediate environment of mother and father. In other words, we are an undifferentiated unity and totally dependent. Through the slow and sometimes painful process of differentiation and withdrawal of projections, we discover what is our self and what is other. Carrying this through to its circular<sup>362</sup> conclusion, we become aware of not only the external physical aspect of reality, but also the inner realm of images, characters and emotions. As we shall see later in this study, it is akin to Nietzsche's concept of the 'eternal return'. Withdrawing projections and differentiating the opposites also means becoming aware of the unity of inside and outside. This is why the ancients regarded an emotion like anger, possession by an inner God. The God (inner character) gives the emotion, which possesses consciousness until the emotion subsides and recedes back into the unconscious.

In this movement, however, consciousness experiences just this emergence of individuality in the Unchangeable, and of the Unchangeable in individuality. Consciousness becomes aware of individuality in general in the Unchangeable, and at the same time of its own individuality in the latter. For the truth of this movement is just the oneness of this dual consciousness..... This unity, however, in the first instance, becomes for it one in which the difference of both is still the dominant feature. Thus there exist for consciousness three different ways in which individuality is linked with the Unchangeable. Firstly, it again appears to itself as opposed to the Unchangeable, and is thrown back to the beginning of the struggle which is throughout the element in which the whole relationship subsists. Secondly, consciousness learns that individuality belongs to the Unchangeable itself, so that it assumes the form of individuality into which the entire mode of existence passes. Thirdly, it finds its own self as this particular individual in the Unchangeable. The first Unchangeable is a form of individuality like itself, consciousness becomes, thirdly, Spirit, and experiences the joy of finding itself therein, and becomes aware of the reconciliation of its individuality with the universal.<sup>363</sup>

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<sup>361</sup> Ibid, page 108

<sup>362</sup> Although it can be interpreted as circular, experience shows that it is a spiral towards a centre.

<sup>363</sup> HEGEL G W F, *Phenomenology of Spirit, Freedom of Self-Consciousness; B. Stoicism, Scepticism, and the Unhappy Consciousness*, Oxford University Press, 1977, pages 127 and 128

Hegel again explores the threefold process of becoming aware of one's self. The first stage, the emergence of the individual from the unconscious (Unchangeable) and the recognition of the uniqueness and opposition to that origin. The second stage, the awareness of that origin and its ongoing value and the need to link back or relate to it. The third stage is finding the meaning of one's personal place in relation to that origin. It is what is generally termed 'enlightenment', when one's inner centre or unity becomes visible.

With this appears the third relationship of the process of this consciousness, which proceeds from the second as a consciousness that has truly proved itself to be independent, by its will and its deed.<sup>364</sup>

This sentence however, looks like Hegel's feeling of independence has more to do with the physical world than the inner world. Indeed, finding one's self includes a certain amount of independence from the world, but not our body as we depend on it to live. We still have to eat, drink, and love and that does not change until the death of our body. In addition, independence is bi-directional in that we not only have to become independent of our physical existence, but also the inner characters that motivate us to action. Possession by an organisation or physical activity is as real as possession by an inner character or idea. The world is full of well-meaning people that belong to political movements in opposition to other political movements. This is possession by an idea through collective identification.

This mediated relation is thus a syllogism in which the individuality, initially fixed in its antithesis to the in-itself, is united with this other extreme only through a third term. Through this middle term the one extreme, the Unchangeable, is brought into relation with the unessential consciousness, which equally is brought into relation with the Unchangeable only through this middle term; thus this middle term is one which presents the two extremes to one another, and ministers to each in its dealings with the other. This middle term is itself a conscious Being [the mediator], for it is an action which mediates consciousness as such; the content of this action is the extinction of its particular individuality which consciousness is undertaking.<sup>365</sup>

In the above Hegel clarifies the third uniting character as a 'conscious being', or 'mediator', whose attributes are becoming clearer to him. As the next passage shows, he goes further and calls the third the minister and priest, thus recognising its spiritual or religious character.

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<sup>364</sup> Ibid, page 135

<sup>365</sup> Ibid, page 136



In the mediator, then, this consciousness frees itself from action and enjoyment so far as they are regarded as its own. As a separate, independent extreme, it rejects the essence of its will, and casts upon the mediator or minister [priest] its own freedom of decision, and herewith the responsibility for its own action. This mediator, having direct relationship with the unchangeable being, ministers by giving advice on what is right. The action, since it follows upon the decision of someone else, ceases, as regards the doing or the willing of it, to be its own.<sup>366</sup>

In addition, Hegel gives this mediator freedom of decision and responsibility for its own action. This is an interesting stage in Hegel's awareness of the mediator, which is clearly a character in its own right. He also sees the relationship between the mediator and the 'unchangeable being', which is the difference between God and the idea of God, or in Hegel's case, God's representative in the form of mediator or priest. There is a danger in Hegel's attitude to his mediator and accept 'what is right' blindly without criticism. What is right for one is wrong for another.

We know from history that not all ideas of God are benevolent, loving and right for us. It is the personal moral conscience that also needs nurturing and a differentiation of one's ethics a necessity. Inner characters have positive and negative sides and it is not always easy to discern between them. This is why it is important to have a dialogue with inner characters to discover and understand their true nature. When seen in this light, we can understand how an inner character can possess a leader with inadequate moral development<sup>367</sup>.

As the individual in his individual work already unconsciously performs a universal work, so again he also performs the universal work as his conscious object; the whole becomes, as a whole, his own, his own work, for which he sacrifices himself and precisely in so doing receives back from it his own self.<sup>368</sup>

This union itself still falls within consciousness and the whole just considered is one side of an antithesis. This illusory appearance of an antithesis which still remains, is removed by the transition or the means; for the means is a *unity* of inner and outer, the antithesis of the specific character it has as an *inner* means.<sup>369</sup>

These passages emphasise the idea of sacrifice to the mediator and its position between inner and outer, subject and object or conscious and

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<sup>366</sup> Ibid, page 136

<sup>367</sup> An example is the possession of Hitler by the Teutonic god Wotan.

<sup>368</sup> HEGEL G W F, Phenomenology of Spirit, Actualizing of Self Consciousness, B. The Actualization of Rational Self-Consciousness through its Own Activity, page 213.

<sup>369</sup> Ibid, C. Individuality which takes Itself to be Real in and for Itself, page 240

unconscious, and the central position between these realms unites them as one.

The one extreme, the universal self-conscious Spirit, becomes, through the individuality of the man, united with its other extreme, its force and element, with Unconscious Spirit. On the other hand, the divine law has its individualization- or the unconscious Spirit of the individual its real existence- in the Spirit rises out of its unreality into actual existence, out of a state in which it is unknowing and unconscious into the realm of conscious Spirit. The union of man and woman constitutes the active middle term of the whole and the element which sunders itself into these extremes of divine and human law.<sup>370</sup>

Hegel differentiates his idea of mediator further and discusses the process of making it conscious and bringing the spirit into the light of day. In this way, one lives out their destiny as a process of self-revelation. In other words, a process of becoming aware of one's own functioning, beliefs, wishes, fallibilities, ambitions, undeveloped areas and insecurities, etc. This knowledge and acceptance brings the unity in one's nature closer to our awareness. He rightly describes the union of opposites of male and female in relationship as the unity of personality. The more one becomes conscious of this union, the more one can become an active participant in its realisation.

He regards one side as real and the other unreal. It could simply be a poor choice of words on Hegel's part, but to realise the central mediator requires an acknowledgment of the equality and reality of both sides. The identification of one or other side means that Hegel is still not convinced of the reality of projection and the influence the unconscious has on our conscious lives. Buildings do not make themselves and similarly, anything created by humans has its origins in the unconscious creative spirit. They all begin as an idea, and as such become physical through great effort and conscious realisation. We have therefore to acknowledge the reality of unconscious creative acts.

We have first to consider the simple unitary substance itself in the immediate organization of its moments, which are present in the substance but as yet have not been stirred into life. In the same way that Nature displays itself in the universal elements of Air, Water, Fire and Earth: Air is the enduring, purely universal, and transparent element; Water, the element that is perpetually sacrificed; Fire, the unity which energizes them into opposition while at the same time it perpetually resolves the opposition; lastly, Earth, which is the firm and solid knot of this articulated whole, the subject of these elements and of their process, that from which they start and to which they return; so in the same way,

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<sup>370</sup> Ibid, A. The True Spirit. The Ethical Order, page 278

the inner essence or simple Spirit of self-conscious actuality displays itself in similar such universal- but here spiritual- 'masses' or spheres, displays itself as a world.<sup>371</sup>

The excellent passage above honouring Plato's cosmology and using its terms to describe the four poles of unity is exactly what concerns modern psychology<sup>372</sup>. Hegel describes the shape of his idea of unity as a sphere and a world. His conception is an elaboration of the usual two-dimensional Mandala, giving it extended reality. In other words, three dimensions make his unity real in the physical world.

The spirit of self-alienation has its existence in the world of culture. But since this whole has become alienated from itself, there stands beyond that world the unreal world of *pure consciousness*, or of *thought*. Its content is in the form of pure thought, and thought is its absolute element. Since, however, thought is in the first instance [only] the *element* of this world, consciousness has only these thoughts, but as yet it does not think them, or is unaware that they are thoughts; they exist for consciousness in the form of *picture-thoughts*.<sup>373</sup>

The recognition of one's unity and standing between the psychic and physical and an awareness of the mediator gives increased insight into human nature, as well as nature in general, in all its positive and negative aspects. For example, when a culture develops one side at the expense of the other, a natural reaction attempts to balance the culture and return it to equilibrium. This reaction can take many forms and is often reflected in the arts or a spiritual movement in a positive sense, or war in a negative sense.

Conscience, then, in the majesty of its elevation above specific law and every content of duty, puts whatever content it pleases into its knowing and willing. It is the moral genius which knows the inner voice of what it immediately knows to be a divine voice; and since, in knowing this, it has an equally immediate knowledge of existence, it is the divine creative power which in its Notion possesses the spontaneity of life.<sup>374</sup>

In the above passage, Hegel hints at the origins of morality in the form of 'conscience', and this voice directed at the physical world in the form of moral codes and attitudes. Where does this voice come from and is it a male or female? Hegel describes his conscience as a 'divine voice' and possesses the spontaneity of life. In other words, his voice belongs to the

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<sup>371</sup> Ibid, B. Self-Alienated Spirit. Culture, page 300

<sup>372</sup> See Jung's description of the four orienting functions of Thinking (air), Feeling (water), Intuition (fire) and Sensation (earth).

<sup>373</sup> HEGEL G W F, Phenomenology of Spirit, Actualizing of Self Consciousness, b. Faith and Pure Insight, page 321

<sup>374</sup> Ibid, page 397

upper realm of spirit and not the lower of instinct. 'Spontaneity of life', for a thinking man has a feeling quality to it. That is to say, spontaneity of life means involvement in the world and enjoying its pleasures. Traditionally, feeling is a feminine quality rather than a masculine quality. Following this line of thinking, Hegel's inner conscience is for him feminine, divine, related to the physical world (life) and a moral judging function (feeling).

The oracle, both of the God of the religions of art and of the preceding religions, is the necessary, first from of the God's utterance; for the Notion of the God implies that he is the essence of both Nature and Spirit, and therefore has not only natural but spiritual existence as well.<sup>375</sup>

This passage shows that Hegel included nature in his understanding of God, and the following passage brings the whole thing together into a four-fold arrangement with the fifth function completing his previous expression of the trinity and return to the unity of one.

In so far as the otherness falls into two parts, Spirit might, as regards its moments- if these are to be counted- be more exactly expressed as a quaternity in unity or, because the quaternity itself again falls into two parts, viz. One part which has remained good and the other which has become evil, might even be expressed as a five-in-one<sup>376</sup>

Hegel describes the quaternity of unity above and its parts as 'moments' and the two halves as good and evil. The problem with such a wide sweeping statement is the lack of understanding moral relativity. What is good for one is bad for another, exemplified by the differing moral stances of the great religions. It is unclear what evil he refers to in the above text, but does elaborate on the idea of unity and its functions (moments), which belong to the individual in the following:

The soul universal, described, it may be, as an *anima mundi*, a world-soul, must not be fixed on that account as a single subject; it is rather the universal *substance* which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects.<sup>377</sup>

In the usage of ordinary language, sensation and feeling are not clearly distinguished: still we do not speak of the sensation- but of the feeling (sense) of right, of self; sentimentality (sensitivity) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity- the fact that we find ourselves feeling, i.e. the immediacy of

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<sup>375</sup> Ibid, Religion in the Form of Art, page 430

<sup>376</sup> Ibid, c. The Revealed Religion, page 469

<sup>377</sup> HEGEL G W F, Philosophy of Mind, Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of The Philosophical Sciences (1830), Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press 1971 Section One- Mind Subjective, A. Anthropology, The Soul, (a) The Physical Soul, page 35

mode in feeling- whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is *we ourselves* who feel.<sup>378</sup>

Hegel recognises the universal function of soul is expressed individually. That is to say, every man and woman has a soul but the function of that soul depends on the individual. Hegel describes the functions of feeling and sensation as a further differentiation of his soul. What he does not recognise, is that these functions are not universally associated with the soul and depend on the nature of the individual. For example, a man consciously oriented towards sensation and thinking will have a soul oriented towards the opposites of intuition and feeling.

Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life, say between friends, especially female friends with delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomenon), between husband and wife and between members of the same family. ....But this sensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious, congenital disposition and temperament, but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retains also (in habit, as to which see later) all further ties and essential relationships, fortunes, principles- everything in short belonging to the character, and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated. This concentrated individuality also reveals itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling.<sup>379</sup>

Hegel continues in his exploration of attraction and repulsion and recognises the similarity between attraction in people and magnetic forces in matter. This is an apt description of the feeling function and how the relationships one forms are an integral part of one's personality. Indeed, personality forms by the relationships we have in the physical world, and the relationships we have to our inner characters, including the soul.

The self possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness of the ordered whole of his individual world, into the system of which he subsumes each special content of sensation, idea, desire, inclination, etc., as it arises, so as to insert them in their proper place. He is the dominant genius over these particularities. Between this and insanity the difference is like that between waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the difference the dream falls within the waking limits, and so makes part of the actual self-feeling.<sup>380</sup>

He elaborates on his idea of unity and how it lies between waking and dreaming. Insanity is the contamination of dream in the waking state and

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<sup>378</sup> Ibid, page 88

<sup>379</sup> Ibid, page 95

<sup>380</sup> Ibid, (b) Self-feeling (Sense of Self), page 123

a flooding of material incapable of integration by the individual. He neglects to mention that projection of unconscious products is the natural but undifferentiated state of relationship to the physical world. The way couples are attracted to each other is the projection of an inner character onto an actual person. This is not limited to people either. We quite often see projections onto man-made objects such as cars, boats, aeroplanes, buildings, and give them a personality.

This is the myth-making function that unites the inner and outer realms. Cars, aeroplanes, buildings, etc., do not exist in nature; people design and make them. They are constructs of ideas that come from our inner nature. When we observe a man-made object we can marvel at its colour, form, line as well as its atomic structure, held in place by attractive electromagnetic forces, and so on.

.....in creative imagination the general idea or representation constitutes the subjective element which gives itself objectivity in the image and thereby authenticates itself. This authentication is, however, itself immediately still a subjective one, since intelligence in the first instance still has regard to the given content of the images, is guided by it in symbolizing its general ideas. This conditioned, only relatively free, activity of intelligence we call symbolic imagination. This selects for the expression of its general ideas only that sensuous material whose independent signification corresponds to the specific content of the universal to be symbolized.<sup>381</sup>

On the other hand, objects and people attract projections with symbolic content, as Hegel notes above. Men generally project a woman onto their cars, and love, polished and tune them so they transport them to far-off places and adventures<sup>382</sup>. It is however, important to know what we are projecting as this helps us become aware of our inner characters. Having said that, giving a projection or inner character freedom of expression makes the physical world a magical place of wonder and excitement.

Luna (feminine) is no longer is a stony spherical desert orbiting the earth, but a feminine beacon of light with moods and the ability to reflect her partner Sol (masculine). In this instance, we have knowledge of the moon as it is and what we project onto her. In this case our thinking tells us what the moon is from our scientific knowledge<sup>383</sup>, but our perception of her behaviour in the day and night sky gives us a feeling of her moods and her cycles. As we shall see in the following study, Hegel's ideas on

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<sup>381</sup> Ibid, Zusatz, page 211

<sup>382</sup> I am speaking here as a man and using this as one example of many.

<sup>383</sup> In reality the knowledge we have of the moon is secondary because only a few individuals have actually stood on it and experienced her first hand. The every day experience of her is available to everyone, and is immediate and direct.

the nature of human thought, perception and insights, predate the modern era and its researches into human psychology.

## I. Nietzsche F. W. (1844 - 1900)

We now come to the most tragic of philosophers, whose life was epitome of that tragedy. Nietzsche lost his father and brother at an early age and was raised by his mother and grandmother. He was a sensitive man for obvious reasons, but highly intelligent. He was a great admirer of Schopenhauer and like him, had poor relationships with women. This inevitably led to his final isolation, and coupled with illness, his madness. His insights into human nature and the prevailing culture were however, far-reaching. His appreciation of music and dance was indelible to his personality as the following quote shows 'Without music, life would be a mistake'.

For all his problems, Nietzsche had a very fine intuition that enabled him to see far beyond his epoch and what was to befall Germany in the twentieth century. His intuition was predominately directed inward to the world of images and ideas, which made him highly visionary. For Nietzsche, music and dance was part of his relation to the world and a connection to his soul. As a deep intuitive thinker, music and dance was part of his sensual feeling and his unity.

Now, hearing this gospel of universal harmony, each person feels himself to be not simply united, reconciled or merged with his neighbour, but quite literally one with him, as if the veil of maya had been torn apart, so that mere shreds of it flutter before the mysterious primordial unity (*das Ur-Eine*).<sup>384</sup>

This fondness for music and dance led him to the exploration of his unity through the Greek Gods Dionysus and Apollo, who expressed music in different ways.<sup>385</sup>

We are now drawing closer to the true goal of our study, the aim of which is to understand the Dionysiac-Apolline genius and its work of art, or at least to gain some tentative intimation of that mysterious unity.<sup>386</sup>

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<sup>384</sup> NIETZSCHE, Frederich, 'The Birth of Tragedy' Cambridge University Press, 1999. Nietzsche refers to Beethoven's 'Hymn to Joy' page 18

<sup>385</sup> It is my intention to show that these two half brothers are not exactly opposites, but stand side-by-side with different expressions of inner characters. Instinct and image come from the same place.

<sup>386</sup> NIETZSCHE, Frederich 'The Birth of Tragedy' Cambridge University Press, 1999, page 28

We shall have gained much for the science of aesthetics when we have come to realize, not just through logical insight but also with the certainty of something directly apprehended (*Anschauung*), that the continuous evolution of art is bound up with the duality of the *Apolline* and the *Dionysiac* in much the same way as reproduction depends on there being two sexes which co-exist in a state of perpetual conflict interrupted only occasionally by periods of reconciliation.

Nietzsche regards Dionysus and Apollo as opposites united within the framework of art. To understand these two ancient characters and what they could have meant to Nietzsche, I shall go through a brief history, describe their characteristics and how they fit into the ancient pantheon. Dionysus and Apollo were half-brothers with the same father called Zeus, the king of the Gods.

Dionysus's birth had many difficulties. Zeus had an affair with the mortal Semele and his wife Hera found out about the affair and Semele's pregnancy. Hera, motivated by jealousy befriends Semele and convinces her to ask Zeus to reveal himself to her as the king of the Gods, to which he agrees. He comes to her with lightning and thunder, but forgets that mortals cannot look at the undisguised God, and she dies in the flames of his lightning. Zeus rescues his unborn son Dionysus from her and sews him into his thigh. A few months later Dionysus is born again from his father.

In one version from Crete, Dionysus is the son of Zeus and Persephone, the queen of the underworld. The jealous Hera sends the Titans to rip Dionysus to pieces and eat him. Zeus intervenes, destroys the Titans but could only save the heart of Dionysus. Zeus sews the heart into his thigh and Dionysus is born again. In another version, Zeus gives Dionysus to king Athamas and his wife to protect from Hera and asks them to raise him as a girl. In yet another version, Zeus gives Dionysus to the rain nymphs of Nysa to raise, and another version, to Rhea or Persephone, to raise in the underworld.

Dionysus discovers the secret of the vine early in his childhood, and the jealous Hera strikes him with madness, which drives him to wander the earth. Rhea cures and teaches him her religious rites and sends him to the Far East to teach cultivation of the vine. Dionysus is often associated with the bull, serpent, tiger, leopard, ivy, wine, satyrs, centaurs, theatre, dance and the phallus. Other characteristics are rebirth, dual birth (Zeus incubated him in his thigh) and feminine qualities, and wild women called Maenads often surrounded him. The major characteristic of Dionysian worship is intoxication and shedding of the socialized personality for an ecstatic and liberated state of freed animal behaviour. It was a freeing of natural instinct with its fertilising, liberating and transformative quality.



Zeus has an affair with Leto who gives birth to Apollo as the God of music, truth, prophecy, healing, the sun, the lyre, plague, the bow and arrow and poetry. Apollo is born with a twin sister named Artemis, the chaste huntress. He is also associated with the shining youth, protector of music, spiritual life, moderation, perceptible order, harmony and reason. Once again, Hera's jealousy of yet another pregnancy fathered by Zeus bans Leto from giving birth on terra firma. Consequently, she gives birth to Artemis and Apollo on the floating island of Delos, which later became sacred to Apollo.

Four days after Apollo's birth he kills the chthonic dragon Python sent by Hera to kill Leto. Hera sends the giant Tityos to rape Leto, and both Apollo and Artemis protect her. Zeus hurls Tityos down to Tartarus and pegs him to a rock where a pair of vultures eats his liver every day. Like his father Zeus, Apollo has many female and male lovers and sired many children.

The following table summarises Dionysus and Apollo's activities and interests:

<b>Activity/Attitude</b>	<b>Dionysus</b>	<b>Apollo</b>
Music, Dance & Theatre	Wild, frantic & unrefined	Refined, orderly, considered
Sexuality	Unrestrained, fertile, bisexual, incest, leader of maenads, ambiguous	Restrained, bisexual, leader of muses, ambiguous
Mental State	Mad, instinctive, intoxicated	Reasonable, truthful, orderly, prophetic
Symbolism	Bull, serpent, tiger, leopard, ivy, wine, satyrs, centaurs & phallus	Healing, sun/light, plague, poetry, lyre, archery
Spirituality	Ecstatic, down to earth, raised in underworld	Sungod, protector of evil
Relationship to earth	Strong with vine & underworld, night	Poor, born on floating island, day

The first and major similarity is the common father Zeus who had power and influence over mortals and other Gods. The second similarity is the common threat of the jealous and vengeful Hera who constantly attacked them. Apparently, Zeus's power did not extend to the control of his wife's

rage. Other similarities are their creative expression in the arts, particularly music, ambiguous sexuality and lack of fidelity.

The differences are more pronounced in their creative expression. Dionysus's attitude is wild and frantic, whereas Apollo's is refined and orderly. Sexually Dionysus was rapacious, having approximately 16 consorts and 26 children<sup>387</sup>. This does however, pale compared to Apollo, who had approximately 61 consorts, 76 children and 13 male lovers<sup>388</sup>. Mentally, Dionysus is mad and intoxicated, whereas Apollo is sane and reasonable. Dionysus has several animal, half-animal and material totems including the vine and fertility as symbolised by the phallus. Apollo has healing, sun (consciousness), poetry, music and archery, which are all refined arts. Dionysus is down-to-earth, or beneath the earth (underworld), whereas Apollo is disconnected from the earth as decreed by Hera.

From the above we can see how Nietzsche regarded these two half-brothers as opposites. It must be kept in mind these characters were mythological Gods and not actually humans, therefore they did not live in the physical world with its laws, and should therefore be regarded as inclinations or patterns of behaviour. When seen in this light, the meaning of their lives becomes clear.

Dionysus as an inner character, links us to our animal origins. His unbridled intoxicated sexuality is without boundaries and purely instinctive, yet he has the light of spirituality in his personality. Dionysus was to be raised as a girl to protect him from the negative, rampageous mother figure Hera, giving him an ambiguous sexuality. He does have the potential for renewal, as his rebirth shows from the thigh of his father. This is a curious place for incubation and different to what one would expect. If we amplify the nature of the thigh, it has the strongest muscles in the body and gives us movement on earth through walking and running. The rebirth through the thigh then indicates a predetermined, strong relationship to earth, as does his interest in the vine.

Apollo, on the other hand, is an inclination towards refined culture, beauty and skills. He is a God of daylight and awareness, which heals possession by the instincts, represented by Dionysus. Apollo is a tamed and refined version of Dionysus, hence their common father and negative mother figure Hera. He also relates to Dionysus through his sexual proclivities, which he surpasses Dionysus in number of consorts and children.

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<sup>387</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dionysus#Other\\_parallels](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dionysus#Other_parallels)

<sup>388</sup> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo>

The biggest difference between the half-brothers is their relationship to the feminine. They both have a negative mother figure in Hera. Dionysus was to be raised as a girl indicating a potential for both genders of equal stature contained within his character. There is however, no indication or description of Dionysus as a girl, so it was undifferentiated in his character. Apollo was born as a twin to Artemis, as an equal feminine (sister) separate and differentiated. In addition, she was chaste and sexuality ignored, repressed or purified. This explains why Apollo was refined, in that his feeling (Artemis) developed to a high degree in its aesthetic and spiritual form, rather than its instinctive sexual form. She is also the Goddess of the hunt, wild animals, wilderness, childbirth and virginity, which is the ideal type to tame the wild beast in a man.

Nietzsche espoused the virtues of the aesthetic expression by these characters and lived aspects of them at some time in his life. In his earlier years, he had drunken bouts at university, was a keen dancer, and reported to have contracted syphilis from a brothel. In his later years, he became stoic and rejected most of the relationships he developed over the years, including his friendship with Wagner who had developed his Apollonian traits to a high degree. The function that Nietzsche lacked was a feeling for people in contrast to a feeling for inner characters. Extraverted feeling would have kept him connected to others and may have saved him from his tragic fate.

This mode of thought, with which a definite type of man is bred, starts from an absurd presupposition: it takes good and evil for realities that contradict one another (not as complementary value concepts, which would be the truth), it advises taking the side of the good, it desires that the good should renounce and oppose the evil down to its ultimate roots—it therewith actually denies life, which has in all its instincts both Yes and No. Not that it grasps this: it dreams, on the contrary, that it is getting back to wholeness, to unity, to strength of life: it thinks it will be a state of redemption when the inner anarchy, the unrest between those opposing value drives, is at last put an end to. Perhaps there has never before been a more dangerous ideology, a greater mischief in psychologics, than this will to good: one has reared the most repellent type, the unfree man, the bigot; one has taught that only as a bigot is one on the right path to Godhood, only the bigot's way is God's way.<sup>389</sup>

The above passage shows that Nietzsche rejects the notion of a one-sided life oriented towards good without it is opposite of evil. This is part of Nietzsche's rejection of the Christian tradition in favour of the Hellenistic half brothers Dionysus and Apollo and Nietzsche's idea of

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<sup>389</sup> NIETZSCHE, Frederick, 'The Will to Power' Vintage Books 1968, Page 192

unity. Unfortunately, it remained an aesthetic consideration and not integrated into his life. If he had turned around and honoured his Dionysian inclinations in his later years with 'wine women and song', his isolation may have subsided and his return journey to earth made possible.

The word "*Dionysian*" means: an urge to unity, a reaching out beyond personality, the everyday, society, reality, across the abyss of transitoriness: a passionate-painful overflowing into darker, fuller, more floating states; an ecstatic affirmation of the total character of life as that which remains the same, just as powerful, just as blissful, through all change; the great pantheistic sharing of joy and sorrow that sanctifies and calls good even the most terrible and questionable qualities of life; the eternal will to procreation, to fruitfulness, to recurrence; the feeling of the necessary unity of creation and destruction.

The word "*Apollinian*" means: the urge to perfect self sufficiency, to the typical "individual," to all that simplifies, distinguishes, makes strong, clear, unambiguous, typical: freedom under the law.

The further development of art is as necessarily tied to the antagonism between these two natural artistic powers as the further development of man is to that between the sexes. Plenitude of power and moderation, the highest form of self-affirmation in a cool, noble, severe beauty: the Apollinianism of the Hellenic will.<sup>390</sup>

The above text shows that Nietzsche's unity lies with the Dionysian instinct and the 'herd' in general. What Nietzsche did not recognise is that the unity between these two characters is already present. They overlap in many ways in that they are half-brothers, have the same father and a jealous mother character attacking them. The brothers were also fond of bisexuality, music and self-expression.

Nietzsche understood the opposites in himself but did not integrate them into his life. His wild youth and refined writings could not be reconciled and integrated into a whole. Music is the common activity of both Dionysus and Apollo and can be practiced individually, it can be expressed collectively, which brings musicians together in harmony. Nietzsche's love of music was attached to his friendship with Wagner and when that ended, so too did his need for a musical life with other people. The tragedy of his life was his attempt to identify with his central inner character within the framework of his own ego. He declared the death of God and saw himself as an 'Overman' or superior human with godlike understanding. If he had something or someone to go back to after this

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<sup>390</sup> Ibid, Page 539

identification or possession by an inner character, he may have come back to himself and the Dionysian spirit of the herd.

### m. James W. (1842- 1910)

James was an American philosopher, originally trained as a physician. He was a pragmatic, down-to-earth man and this coloured his philosophical and psychological outlook. As the following passage shows, he had contempt fuelled by a temperamental lack of understanding for the subjective factor and the reality of the soul. He did try to understand how his predecessors oriented their philosophy around ideas, rather than physical facts, and his later studies showed a fascination with metaphysics.

There is no more contemptible type of human character than that of the nerveless sentimentalist and dreamer, who spends his life in a weltering sea of sensibility and emotion, but who never does a manly concrete deed. Rousseau, inflaming all the mothers of France, by his eloquence, to follow Nature and nurse their babies themselves, while he sends his own children to the founding hospital, is the classical example of what I mean.<sup>391</sup>

The logical conclusion seems then to be that the states of consciousness are all that psychology needs to do her work with. Metaphysics or theology may prove the Soul to exist; but for psychology the hypothesis of such a substantial principle of unity is superfluous.<sup>392</sup>

He regarded the soul as a metaphysical function, which he equates with theology, rather than a psychological reality. He regards 'unity' superfluous for the study of psychology, but concedes that it may be a metaphysical reality. Soul to James is an abstracted idea that has no relationship to the practicality of a material based psychology.

The content of a dream will oftentimes insert itself into the stream of real life in a most perplexing way. The most frequent source of false memory is the accounts we give to others of our experiences. Such accounts we almost always make both more simple and more interesting than the truth.<sup>393</sup>

His orientation is further emphasised by his psychological orientation towards consciousness. He does acknowledge the existence of dreams, but regards them as an epiphenomenon related to 'false' memory. In other words, James draws dream images from physical experience and

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<sup>391</sup> JAMES William, 'Psychology' Macmillan and Co 1892, Page 119

<sup>392</sup> Ibid, page 166

<sup>393</sup> Ibid, page 168

memory of those experiences. His later works called 'The Will to Believe' and 'The Varieties of Religious Experience' show his fascination with the other side of physical reality. This is where his idea of unity presided and he approached it as a true scientist with much scepticism.

The difference between monism and pluralism is perhaps the most pregnant of all the differences in philosophy. *Primâ facie* the world is a pluralism; as we find it, its unity seems to be that of any collection; and our higher thinking consists chiefly of an effort to redeem it from that first crude form. Postulating more unity than the first experiences yield, we also discover more. But absolute unity, in spite of brilliant dashes in its direction, still remains undiscovered, still remains a *Grenzbegriff*.<sup>394</sup>

He discusses the opposites of Monism and Pluralism above, but concludes that absolute unity remains undiscovered. His language and use of the word 'pregnant' in this passage tells us that he regards the difference between the opposites as a potential third uniting principal, incubating for birth. In other words, he recognises but is not yet aware of, the uniting principal in the form of a third function (child). Words are very good at giving away ideas not yet born.

But to find religion is only one out of many ways of reaching unity; and the process of remedying inner incompleteness and reducing inner discord is a general psychological process, which may take place with any sort of mental material, and need not necessarily assume the religious form.<sup>395</sup>

James is right in his recognition that unity is not necessarily a religious task. For example, an intuitive introverted man requires the opposite of relationship to the physical world of matter for unity. The relationship between these opposites does, however display certain spiritual attributes that may or may not have anything to do with a religious creed. It is a part of our nature to evolve towards unity and does not require a religious structure to do so. These institutions are important as they create community and connect patrons to a greater and shared idea of unity, guided by a key individual(s)<sup>396</sup>.

You see how natural it is, from this point of view, to treat religion as a mere survival, for religion does in fact perpetuate the traditions of the most primeval thought. To coerce the spiritual powers, or to square them and get them on our side, was, during enormous tracts of time, the one great object in our dealings with the natural world. For our ancestors,

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<sup>394</sup> JAMES William, 'The Will to Believe' Longmans, Green, And Co 1912, Project Gutenberg EBook, Page 1

<sup>395</sup> JAMES William, 'Varieties of Religious Experience' Longmans, Green, And Co 1903, Page 154

<sup>396</sup> These are the individuals a religion is based on.

dreams, hallucinations, revelations, and cock-and-bull stories were inextricably mixed with facts. Up to a comparatively recent date such distinctions as those between what has been verified and what is only conjectured, between the impersonal and the personal aspects of existence, were hardly suspected or conceived.<sup>397</sup>

He continues in the passage above with the idea that religion relates us to our inner unity (animal with spirit). His use of the words 'cock and bull' gives away his feeling on the material from an unconscious source as less than facts, which is a typical scientific prejudice. No one can argue that having a dream is not a real experience. We perceive images, emotions, ideas and can have physical fatigue from the activity performed in dreams. It is the same as an idea for a building is a fact as much as the final structure. This is the biggest barrier to the reconciliation of psychological schools. In that respect, contemporary physicists are more open to possibilities and acknowledge the effect of the subjective factor on their experiments.

Philosophy has often been defined as the quest or the vision of the world's unity. We never hear this definition challenged, and it is true as far as it goes, for philosophy has indeed manifested above all things its interest in unity. But how about the VARIETY in things? Is that such an irrelevant matter? If instead of using the term philosophy, we talk in general of our intellect and its needs we quickly see that unity is only one of these.<sup>398</sup>

James is right in his plea for the 'variety' of things. Unity is not a static system, it grows, changes, falls apart, re-combines and so on. We are born whole with all the functions in 'potentia', grow and adapt with our natural primary function. A secondary function comes to the primary's aid and the others generally remain unconscious and undeveloped. The primary and secondary functions are differentiated for adaptation to the world. Life changes over time and the urge for unity and development of the other functions becomes more important and can be described as the 'variety of things'.

The difference is that the empiricists are less dazzled. Unity doesn't blind them to everything else, doesn't quench their curiosity for special facts, whereas there is a kind of rationalist who is sure to interpret abstract unity mystically and to forget everything else, to treat it as a principle; to admire and worship it; and thereupon to come to a full stop intellectually.<sup>399</sup>

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<sup>397</sup> JAMES William, 'Varieties of Religious Experience' Longmans, Green, And Co 1903, Page 417

<sup>398</sup> JAMES William, 'Pragmatism', eBooks The University of Adelaide Library, Page 59

<sup>399</sup> Ibid, Page 60

James's emphasis on the 'variety of things' shows that as a rational person, he is mystified by the idea of unity. The intellect is one function and in order to develop other functions, one needs to leave it alone for a time. This is particularly true when one delves into the realm of feeling. This is a function of empathy, judgement and quality, and of the forces of attraction and repulsion. It is the function of relationship and indispensable to one's idea of unity. Feeling sees the relationship between the functions and finds the aspects that binds them together. In other words, the inner female character<sup>400</sup> (soul) in the man relates functions to each other and introduces us to the central character and idea of unity. In the following passage, James discusses number worship, but stops short at historical examples.

'The world is One!'- the formula may become a sort of number-worship. 'Three' and 'seven' have, it is true, been reckoned sacred numbers; but, abstractly taken, why is 'one' more excellent than 'forty-three,' or than 'two million and ten'? In this first vague conviction of the world's unity, there is so little to take hold of that we hardly know what we mean by it.<sup>401</sup>

Number has an obvious quantity but also a quality beyond historical or religious writings. Number '1' is the first digit and sets a counterpart to '0', which lacks substance and from which '1' originated. '2' is the doubling of '1' and differentiation of the opposites. '3' is a further differentiation and uniting function of '1' + '1' where the '+' is the uniting function of opposites. '4' is the completion of the circle and differentiation of all four functions, to '5' and back to the original but differentiated '1' and 'the eternal return'<sup>402</sup>. The difference between the original '1' and final '1' is the other numbers are now in the mix and become the 'variety' of the group. This in itself is an abstract description, which is difficult to understand on its own. In reality, each number has one or more inner characters associated with it, giving the numbers a personal and experiential reality.

1. First, the world is at least ONE SUBJECT OF DISCOURSE. If its manyness were so irremediable as to permit NO union whatever of its parts, not even our minds could 'mean' the whole of it at once: this would be like eyes trying to look in opposite directions. But in point of fact we mean to cover the whole of it by our abstract term 'world' or 'universe,' which expressly intends that no part shall be left out. Such unity of discourse carries obviously no farther monistic specifications. A 'chaos,'

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<sup>400</sup> This is a general statement concerning an intellectual man like James and is only meant schematically. The variety and distribution of psychic functions means the opposite could just as well be true for an individual.

<sup>401</sup> JAMES William, 'Pragmatism', eBooks The University of Adelaide Library, Page 60

<sup>402</sup> Concept made popular by Nietzsche.



once so named, has as much unity of discourse as a cosmos. It is an odd fact that many monists consider a great victory scored for their side when pluralists say 'the universe is many.'

James seems to ignore the faculty of memory by suggesting that we cannot perceive the whole at once. His metaphor of 'eyes trying to look in opposite directions shows that he was too anchored in immediate perception to see the whole. It may not have occurred to him to turn his head in the opposite direction while remembering the other side and thus perceiving the opposite in memory. In this way, one can perceive the physical on one side and the images, ideas etc., on the other. This is the first step in the on-going process to liberate oneself from the opposites.

2. Are they, for example, CONTINUOUS? Can you pass from one to another, keeping always in your one universe without any danger of falling out? In other words, do the parts of our universe HANG together, instead of being like detached grains of sand?

This is where James cannot make the leap from his known 'one universe' of intellect. As shown previously, the inner and outer realms mesh and James recognises that unconscious products like dreams, revelations etc., are 'inextricably mixed with facts'. This statement in itself shows that he perceives the unity, albeit in confused form. I suspect that he was referring to written texts such as the bible, rather than personal experience.

3. There are innumerable other paths of practical continuity among things. Lines of INFLUENCE can be traced by which they together. Following any such line you pass from one thing to another till you may have covered a good part of the universe's extent. Gravity and heat-conduction are such all-uniting influences, so far as the physical world goes. Electric, luminous and chemical influences follow similar lines of influence. But opaque and inert bodies interrupt the continuity here, so that you have to step round them, or change your mode of progress if you wish to get farther on that day. Practically, you have then lost your universe's unity, SO FAR AS IT WAS CONSTITUTED BY THOSE FIRST LINES OF INFLUENCE.<sup>403</sup>

Above, James discusses the 'line of influence' that connects objects and ideas. He rightly identifies the uniting influence of gravity and EME<sup>404</sup> but stops short at 'opaque and inert bodies'. Gravity and EME influences matter and energy, which are the fundamental forces of nature that unite matter and psychic reality through synchronistic phenomena.<sup>405</sup>

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<sup>403</sup> JAMES William, 'Pragmatism', eBooks The University of Adelaide Library, Page 60-61

<sup>404</sup> Heat is one form of Electromagnetic energy.

<sup>405</sup> See chapter 11b on Synchronistic Phenomena

4. All these systems of influence or non-influence may be listed under the general problem of the world's CAUSAL UNITY. If the minor causal influences among things should converge towards one common causal origin of them in the past, one great first cause for all that is, one might then speak of the absolute causal unity of the world. God's fiat on creation's day has figured in traditional philosophy as such an absolute cause and origin. Transcendental Idealism, translating 'creation' into 'thinking' (or 'willing to think') calls the divine act 'eternal' rather than 'first'; but the union of the many here is absolute, just the same — the many would not BE, save for the One. Against this notion of the unity of origin of all there has always stood the pluralistic notion of an eternal self-existing many in the shape of atoms or even of spiritual units of some sort. The alternative has doubtless a pragmatic meaning, but perhaps, as far as these lectures go, we had better leave the question of unity of origin unsettled.

Having established the causal unity of matter, James boldly ventures to the Kantian view of transcendental idealism, which includes the subjective factor and perception of ideas, including the creative act as something eternal. Most people know this creative act as it occurs every day in the form of ideas, hunches, solutions, inspirations etc., that pop into one's awareness spontaneously without the will's involvement. Its source is unknown and has a divine origin. James also compares atoms as 'self-existing many' with their opposite spiritual units. This is similar to what Jung calls the scintilla or luminous archetypes, which I call inner characters. James's idea of unity in the above passages is becoming more distinct.

5. The most important sort of union that obtains among things, pragmatically speaking, is their GENERIC UNITY. Things exist in kinds, there are many specimens in each kind, and what the 'kind' implies for one specimen, it implies also for every other specimen of that kind. We can easily conceive that every fact in the world might be singular, that is, unlike any other fact and sole of its kind. In such a world of singulars our logic would be useless, for logic works by predicating of the single instance what is true of all its kind. With no two things alike in the world, we should be unable to reason from our past experiences to our future ones. The existence of so much generic unity in things is thus perhaps the most momentous pragmatic specification of what it may mean to say 'the world is One.' ABSOLUTE generic unity would obtain if there were one summum genus under which all things without exception could be eventually subsumed. 'Beings,' 'thinkables,' 'experiences,' would be candidates for this position. Whether the alternatives expressed by such words have any pragmatic significance or not, is another question which I prefer to leave unsettled just now.

He continues the differentiation of 'Generic' from 'Absolute' unity and recognises that logic is useless in these forms. Logic (intellect) quantifies and categorises, whereas ideas of unity require an understanding of quality, value and relationship between functions, matter and psyche. The pragmatic significance of knowing 'absolute unity' is mental health, psychological security and living one's true and meaningful life. James touches on this in the following:

6. Another specification of what the phrase 'the world is One' may mean is UNITY OF PURPOSE. An enormous number of things in the world subserve a common purpose. All the man-made systems, administrative, industrial, military, or what not, exist each for its controlling purpose. Every living being pursues its own peculiar purposes. They co-operate, according to the degree of their development, in collective or tribal purposes, larger ends thus enveloping lesser ones, until an absolutely single, final and climacteric purpose subserved by all things without exception might conceivably be reached. It is needless to say that the appearances conflict with such a view. Any resultant, as I said in my third lecture, MAY have been purposed in advance, but none of the results we actually know in is world have in point of fact been purposed in advance in all their details. Men and nations start with a vague notion of being rich, or great, or good. Each step they make brings unforeseen chances into sight, and shuts out older vistas, and the specifications of the general purpose have to be daily changed. What is reached in the end may be better or worse than what was proposed, but it is always more complex and different.

Above, he discusses the construction of societal systems with a 'unity of purpose' and these systems and their end goal do not work for all. Like-minded individuals create political systems, which suit their temperament, believing that everyone governed has the same feeling towards the system. This is the biggest mistake that individuals, particularly extroverts make with the projection of their idea of unity onto the world and turn it into a political system in which others have to live.<sup>406</sup> James continues in the following passage with the misconception that the population will accept another's idea of unity.

Our different purposes also are at war with each other. Where one can't crush the other out, they compromise; and the result is again different from what anyone distinctly proposed beforehand. Vaguely and generally, much of what was purposed may be gained; but everything makes strongly for the view that our world is incompletely unified teleologically and is still trying to get its unification better organized. Whoever claims ABSOLUTE teleological unity, saying that there is one purpose that every detail of the universe subserves, dogmatizes at his

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<sup>406</sup> See chapter 9e 'Possession by the Idea of Unity' for the problems associated with political systems

own risk. Theologians who dogmatize thus find it more and more impossible, as our acquaintance with the warring interests of the world's parts grows more concrete, to imagine what the one climacteric purpose may possibly be like. We see indeed that certain evils minister to ulterior goods, that the bitter makes the cocktail better, and that a bit of danger or hardship puts us agreeably to our trumps. We can vaguely generalize this into the doctrine that all the evil in the universe is but instrumental to its greater perfection. But the scale of the evil actually in sight defies all human tolerance; and transcendental idealism, in the pages of a Bradley or a Royce, brings us no farther than the book of Job did — God's ways are not our ways, so let us put our hands upon our mouth. A God who can relish such superfluities of horror is no God for human beings to appeal to. His animal spirits are too high. In other words the 'Absolute' with his one purpose, is not the man-like God of common people.

He also gives his account of a 'perfect' deity, thus adopting the idea from past philosophers and religious ideas of perfection. He cannot accept that God may be as much a part of nature and a higher omnipotent being. For unity to be real, it has to include everything horrific and sublime. This does not mean that we have to partake in the horrific or live it out, but acknowledge its existence as part of a greater unity. We can only do something about the horrific if we know about it in ourselves. We may have a chance of accepting it in others and see them as they are, rather than who we think they are, or try to fit them into our idea or system of unity.

7. AESTHETIC UNION among things also obtains, and is very analogous to ideological union. Things tell a story. Their parts hang together so as to work out a climax. They play into each other's hands expressively. Retrospectively, we can see that altho no definite purpose presided over a chain of events, yet the events fell into a dramatic form, with a start, a middle, and a finish. In point of fact all stories end; and here again the point of view of a many is that more natural one to take. The world is full of partial stories that run parallel to one another, beginning and ending at odd times. They mutually interlace and interfere at points, but we cannot unify them completely in our minds. In following your life-history, I must temporarily turn my attention from my own. Even a biographer of twins would have to press them alternately upon his reader's attention.

Above, James touches on the aesthetic unity of one's life history and its connection to one's life story and clearly recognises that a life story is an individual pursuit. James's example of the twins ignores the fact that they have a history of common ancestors, not to mention the same mother and a biographer has to include the relationship between the twins as part of their individuality.

8. The GREAT monistic DENKMITTEL for a hundred years past has been the notion of THE ONE KNOWER. The many exist only as objects for his thought — exist in his dream, as it were; and AS HE KNOWS them, they have one purpose, form one system, tell one tale for him. This notion of an ALL-ENVELOPING NOETIC UNITY in things is the sublimest achievement of intellectualist philosophy. Those who believe in the Absolute, as the all-knower is termed, usually say that they do so for coercive reasons, which clear thinkers cannot evade. The Absolute has far-reaching practical consequences, some of which I drew attention in my second lecture. Many kinds of difference important to us would surely follow from its being true. I cannot here enter into all the logical proofs of such a Being's existence, farther than to say that none of them seem to me sound. I must therefore treat the notion of an All-Knower simply as an hypothesis, exactly on a par logically with the pluralist notion that there is no point of view, no focus of information extant, from which the entire content of the universe is visible at once.<sup>407</sup>

This passage sums up James's conclusion of the existence of an all-knowing being and regards it as 'simply a hypothesis'. Indeed, it is beyond our perception and experience. The idea of an all-knowing being as a psychological reality is however, not beyond our perception and experience. This is the biggest difference James did not recognise. Culture is full of these ideas both past and present. Whether the representation of the idea is mythological or religious, like Horus, Zeus, Yahweh, Allah, Jesus, Buddha, Mercurius etc., or political like communism, fascism, liberalism, conservatism etc., shows that its permutation is real and present. The idea of unity can be interpreted in many other ways, such as energy flow or a profession or object of desire such as wealth, power, love, fame and so on.

This is the crucial aspect of understanding the idea of unity. Anyone can perceive and experience it, if open to its influence. Ideas cannot be found in the physical world unless they are expressed in some way. Buildings, towns, governments and religions do not build themselves, as ideas are behind their construction. The idea of unity has many faces, yet the origin of the idea is essentially the same and only different because of individual interpretations. These interpretations depend on the natural temperament, life history and experiences of each individual.

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<sup>407</sup> JAMES William, 'Pragmatism', eBooks The University of Adelaide Library, Page 63-66

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